Sunday, 11 April 2010

Returns from Special Situations to Become Special Again?


A few months ago I was a guest on the hedge fund radio show "The Naked Short Club" on Resonance FM. A question for the panel was "which hedge fund strategies did we each prefer this year?" My choice then and now are the event-driven strategies. I chose those strategies partly because the evidence of surveys of investors have not mentioned event-driven as a favourite (except for distressed), and on the basis of the market environment I see unfolding this year. Distressed securities funds posted the biggest inflow as a percentage of AUM in February this year (at 4.2% of assets) according to TrimTabs Investment Research and BarclayHedge - so they are hardly being ignored.

It still remains the case that investors compiling survey responses cite what has done well for the last six months, but what has changed over a shorter time-frame is the outlook for the special situations component of the event driven set of strategies. At the turn of the year it was somewhat fanciful to suggest that the market environment would be suitable for special sits investors - up to that point corporate activity was very limited in publicly traded markets. From a UK perspective we had a clear landmark takeover in the acquisition of Cadbury's by Kraft Inc, but other forms of M&A activity have taken place and there is activity in sectors beyond those that are consumer-related. The stock markets have reached recovery highs, retracing all of the fall from the second week of January into mid February. This has revived the animal spirits that drive markets, and primary and secondary issuance has picked up and will increase from here. 

IPOs  Spin-outs and Buy-ins as well as Takeovers

The issuance will be for a range of purposes- IPOs, spin-outs, and buy-ins as well as takeovers. IPOs that were scheduled to take place in February and were postponed will now be back under active consideration. The recovery in valuations in markets will encourage managements to listen to the sum-of-the-parts arguments and enhance shareholder value through spin-outs like that of Enquest from Petrofac. Just last week there was an example of a buy-in, as Agnico-Eagle Mines stepped up to the plate and elected to offer to acquire all the shares it does not already own in Comaplex Minerals.

M&A is back in the revived energy sector, and will come back in other resource-based sectors. The Chinese have stated their desire to acquire strategic resources on a global basis, and their activities will spark the attention of other acquirers on a game theory basis. In upstream energy in 2009 alone, China spent $16 billion gaining footprints in Canadian oil sands, the Gulf of Mexico, Nigeria, Gabon, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia and Kazakhstan. There are expected to be more National Oil Company acquisitions this year in unconventional oil and gas production primarily sourced from gas shales, tight gas sands and oil sands according to industry consultants. Energy M&A will not be confined to NOCs and producing assets as shown by the acquisition of Smith International by Schlumberger.
In mining the secondary and tertiary stocks amongst the miners and mineral exploration stocks have started to out-perform the global major mining stocks as interest warms up. Before Easter there was corporate activity in gold (Newcrest's proposal to merge with Lihir Gold) and in the coal sector, and further deals in zinc. 

Not Just Resources

However, deal flow will not be confined to resources industries, as value is apparent elsewhere to corporate buyers. Hedge fund manager Leon Cooperman of Omega Advisors has been interviewed in Fortune magazine recently. Asked about increased takeover activity he said that it reflects the fact that the stock market is selling about in line with replacement costs. "With the credit markets improving and business getting a little better, corporations are showing a willingness to buy other businesses, and they are paying up for them," he noted*.

He continued, "We have seen a large number of deals where the average premium over the market price has been approximately 40%. When Air Products (APD, Fortune 500) bids $5 billion in cash for AirGas (ARG), which is 38% over market price, Air Products is telling us they feel sufficiently comfortable about their own business that they are willing to take on a lot of debt to do the deal. It's the same thing with Merck AG's $7 billion offer to buy Millipore (MIL) and Simon Property's (SPG) $10 billion bid to acquire General Growth Properties (GGP). When you buy a share in a business, you're buying a share of its brick, mortar, machinery, and earning power. What corporations are saying is that the equity market is not overvalued."

The corporate buyer has not been absent from the market, but should be more evident in the rest of this year. The pressures resulting from the "shareholder value" mantra is still there, and the continuing recovery of the banking sector will allow some debt financing this year, which was largely absent last year. For similar reasons it would not come as a surprise to see more activity by private equity in the second half of the year, both disposals and acquisitions. This combination of factors will present an increasingly rich environment for managers of special situations capital, both on a dedicated basis and as part of a multi-strategy offering. Better returns will result for special sits strategies.

  *The article won't link directly but can be found at http://money.cnn.com/, using search term "Leon Cooperman"



Friday, 9 April 2010

Fund of Hedge Funds Consolidation: The gun has been fired

For just about all of the last decade it has been consistently suggested that the fund of hedge funds sector was just about to consolidate.


Industry watchers suggested that the three different size categories had very different profiles - as potential acquirers and takeover targets. The medium-sized players were going to snap-up their smaller brethren. The larger players were going to add to their assets under management by picking up medium-sized funds, and small funds of funds looked out-moded and should merge or fade away, so it was said and written.

The rationale for consolidation had several arguments:-

  1. The industry was mature, as shown by the declining average fees charged.

  2. Assets under management in funds of hedge funds as a percentage of the whole hedge fund industry peaked as long ago as the middle of 2008.

Graphic 1. Global Fund of Funds Industry








  









Source:IFSL estimates

   
3. In 2009 the attrition rate amongst funds of funds was twice the rate of single manager funds at times.
  
4. The costs of being in the business were on the rise as staff remuneration and the costs of compliance were only going up.
  
5. Institutional investors were increasingly dominating flows into the industry, and only large scale fund of funds organisations looked of institutional quality.
  
6. Brand names and critical mass were important to institutional investors and furthermore this client base required high-end (and therefore expensive) risk management systems and risk management professionals.
 
7. Assets are still leaving funds of hedge funds - according to TrimTabs they lost $17.4 billion in the three months to February 2010. 

In short, for five years it has been widely held that the margins of funds of hedge funds could only contract, and that the prevailing business models couldn’t be sustained.

In such an environment it became logical for founders of businesses, particularly of the boutique “family-office-plus”, to sell out and capitalise on the growth of their funds of funds businesses. But somehow it never quite happened to the extent expected.

However, a coincidence of recent events suggests that maybe, at last, we are about to see some M&A activity amongst funds of hedge funds. Here is a sample of some of the recent deals done.

In the last year

In January 2010 the Swiss based quoted multi-strategy firm Gottex bought the three Constellar funds of funds run by Ted Wong. The assets under management, at $150m, were not significant relative to the rest of Gottex, which manages over $8bn, mostly in market-neutral products. But they diversify the product mix into directional multi-strategy funds of funds offerings and, maybe more significantly, increase the firm’s knowledge of the US onshore and offshore markets.

Serial acquirer Aberdeen Asset Management has added to its string of acquisitions of long-only businesses by acquiring some alternative asset management contracts. In November of last year Aberdeen picked up the management contract for Bramdean Alternatives, giving it an opportunity to look at the fund of hedge funds business at close hand. It must have liked what it saw because in February 2010 Aberdeen paid £84.7 million to RBS for assets under management of £13.5 billion (as at 30 September 2009), comprising an established, award-winning fund of hedge funds business (that of Coutts), a long-only multi-manager business and certain private equity and real estate funds of funds. Aberdeen has built good distribution, and plugging-in alternative investment strategies should further diversify the revenue streams, and the fund of funds product can be pushed into existing channels when appropriately packaged.

It is true that the long tail of fund of hedge funds businesses has shrunk somewhat in the last 18 months. Ansbacher left the business, as did Commerzbank via its COMAS subsidiary, and tiddlers like Collingham Capital Management undertook an organised retreat from the business.

Several hedge fund firms ran in-house funds of funds that they hoped to commercialise, following the template of Renaissance Technologies’ Meritage Fund, the West Coast fund of funds that was founded to invest partners’ capital in single manager hedge funds. But these “natural extensions” of the business can find it as hard as unconnected funds of funds to get traction. For example, London based money manager Millennium Global closed down its small fund of funds run by Hamlin Lovell in the middle of last year, and Brevan Howard had a good-hard-look at entering the fund of funds business before deciding against it in 2009.


In the last month

That hesitation shown by Brevan Howard has been overcome by a couple of buyers of fund of funds businesses in the last month. First, Collins Stewart, the stockbroking and wealth management firm, has bought discretionary investment management firm Corazon Capital which has £382 million in assets under management with offices in Guernsey and Geneva. Corazon Capital was itself a management buy-out from Dawnay Day in 2008. Curiously the deal with Collins Stewart has been done for only £1m cash paid. As much as a further £6m worth of shares could be paid as the balance of the consideration over three years, dependent on performance in the next 12 months. In January 2009 Corazon had $1.2bn AUM, so the shape of the deal may be explained by the drop in assets alone. As for strategic rationale, Collins Stewart has long had a Guernsey presence and a small Geneva office itself, so there is a clear scope to reduce costs – as long as they hold onto the assets.

Second, and maybe the larger surprise of the two deals announced for funds of funds last month, was the purchase of a 75.1% stake in Aida Capital by Standard Life Investments. Aida Capital is a London based, FSA registered, fund of hedge funds manager. Aida currently manages the Aida Open-Ended Fund, a Guernsey listed investment vehicle and the Aida Closed-Ended Fund, an investment fund listed on the London Stock Exchange. In total AUM at Aida are around $50m, whilst Standard Life manages around $207bn. A “modest upfront fee” will be paid for the stake. At that scale it is all upside for Standard Life – it will have access to a wider range of alternative investments than before, and new fund of hedge fund products will be created specifically for Standard Life, which may be distributed through recognised life company channels. It is also open for the life company assets to be invested in funds of hedge funds, particularly when the issues of legal structure are resolved in the UCITS III format.

Neither of the two deals done last month, nor the deals done over the last year in the fund of hedge fund sector are large or involve major firms in the business. So how can there be an idea that the starting gun has been fired for acquisitions of fund of hedge fund businesses? It is partly the passage of time from the financial disaster of the 2H of 2008, and the condition of the financial markets now, and the turnaround in flows to hedge funds. Unlike during previous rallies from bear market lows in the early Noughties there are now hedge fund businesses with listings. The value of their shares as takeover currency has been rising, and a number of them have existing fund of hedge fund businesses. Merger and acquisition activity was muted last year but has risen this year in other sectors: as market levels have risen so entrepreneurial spirits have been able to get funded. The same should apply to quoted alternative asset management and hedge fund businesses.

The flows into single manager hedge fund businesses re-started in the middle of last year. The sales cycle for funds of funds is longer than ever, but the commitment of institutional investors to their hedge fund investment programmes should mean that funds of funds will see positive flows on a net basis by the middle of this year. And so top line growth is an additional consolidation driver. There is also scope to do deals to leverage a fund of funds infrastructure that has a lot of capacity for capital growth and margin expansion, like Aida Capital.

So there are a number of motivations and corporate strategies at play in the new environment for takeovers of funds of funds businesses. The gun has been fired.


The bulk of this article first appeared on The Hedge Fund Journal website

Wednesday, 24 March 2010

The Shrinkage of Hedge Fund Seeding Capital

I have written in the past (http://simonkerrhfblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/gathering-assets-still-difficult-for.html , http://simonkerrhfblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/excess-supply-of-emerging-managers-to.html ) that my expectation is that emerging manager hedge funds will find raising capital difficult. Part of the reason for this view is the shrinkage of seeding capital providers. Infovest21 is the source for this overviewing of the status quo in hedge fund seeding:



The size of assets committed in the overall seeding industry dropped in 2008/2009 as has the number of seeders actively providing seeding capital.


Seeding is very resource-intensive. It requires sourcing a wide range of proposals, having the skills and resources to analyze diverse strategies, having negotiating skills and helping put businesses together. This cuts down on the number of firms that can do it, says Patric de Gentile- Williams of FRM’s Capital Advisors. “People are getting out of seeding business because it is a very hard business - you need to find the talent, be a risk manager of the talent and have a disciplined marketing plan for the business,” adds Anthony Scaramucci of Skybridge Capital.

In 2007, there were 50-90 seeders. Today, there are just a handful of active seeders. Many of the active seeders don’t expect the seeding activity to get back to 2007 levels. Many key personnel at some of the larger seeders have left. Many are virtually out of the business but not publicly admitting to that, says one seeder.

The vast majority of seeders were a part of larger businesses. Those businesses became stressed by events in 2008 and had to refocus on their core business at the expense of their peripheral business. “Where seeding was a peripheral activity, it had to be sacrificed even though this is the one of the best times for seeding. In addition, some seeders were within investment banks and were using capital from the bank’s balance sheet. When 2008 arose, much of that capital was withdrawn,” adds Gentile-Williams.

It may be tough for some of the fund of funds’ seeders to come back. Scaramucci says, “If they don’t have the right resources in their organization, then they think they’re in the funds of funds business as a seeder. They’re not in the funds of funds business: they’re in the private equity/intellectual capital management business…When a fund of funds goes into the seeder business, they approach it the way funds of funds would. They don’t get deal terms right. They’re not partnering as tightly with the manager.”


In terms of seeing new candidates to be seeded, seeders say they haven’t seen a better environment. There are large numbers of talented people who want to be entrepreneurs who have been displaced by either the collapse of the firms they were with, whether hedge funds or investment banks, or are in an existing platform where they can’t supply enough capital.


Outlook



Gentile-Williams observes that the first quarter of 2010 has been more active than last year. “The pipeline is very strong; eight or nine managers are in [our] pipeline which could lead to a transaction in the next few months.”

Asset raising at the seed level i.e. raising a new fund is still challenging, say a number of seeders.As general interest for hedge funds picks up, emerging managers will benefit. The challenging piece is that some of the established largest managers, who had been closed, opened up to new investment following the financial crisis. Some of the largest allocators are currently going directly to the larger funds.

If the hedge fund situation improves and liquidity returns to the market, former seeders could return but they will probably do one-off deals rather than a dedicated fund. It could be done as a side letter not as a cookie cutter fund, says a former seeder.

There will be more capital committed and new players. There will be a small number of large players. Some family offices and some institutions are seeding. On the family office side, seeding is often viewed opportunistically. For example, The Koffler Group seeds only one manager or so a year. It seeded EchoBridge with $20 million in 2008. Another example is Parly Company which has seeded about 25 funds in the past.

Some larger pensions are also entering the seeding arena. CalPERS is considering providing start-up money to hedge funds similar to what it has done with private equity. The UK pension fund Railpen is expected to start a hedge fund seeding operations in order to gain greater control of alternative assets. Details haven’t been publicly disclosed yet but sources expect the model will follow the CalPERS and Hermes’ models.

In 2010, New York State Common Retirement Fund seeded London-based Finisterre’s emerging market hedge fund with $250 million.

Monday, 15 March 2010

HF Counterparties: Collateral Arbitrage Benefitting Banks with Large OTC Books

Following up the posting on investment bank rehypothecation of their clients’ assets (http://simonkerrhfblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/rehypothecation-banks-and-hedge-funds.html), there is a great story today on Bloomberg. It highlights further changes in the balance of power in the relationships between hedge funds and the prime brokerage operations of investment banks.



By Michael J. Moore and Christine Harper


March 15 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co., two of the biggest traders of over-the-counter derivatives, are exploiting their growing clout in that market to secure cheap funding in addition to billions in revenue from the business.

Both New York-based banks are demanding unequal arrangements with hedge-fund firms, forcing them to post more cash collateral to offset risks on trades while putting up lesson their own wagers. At the end of December this imbalance furnished Goldman Sachs with $110 billion, according to a filing. That’s money it can reinvest in higher-yielding assets.

“If you’re seen as a major player and you have a product that people can’t get elsewhere, you have the negotiating power,” said Richard Lindsey, a former director of market regulation at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission who ran the prime brokerage unit at Bear Stearns Cos. from 1999 to 2006. “Goldman and a handful of other banks are the places where people can get over-the-counter products today.”

The collapse of American International Group Inc. in 2008 was hastened by the insurer’s inability to meet $20 billion in collateral demands after its credit-default swaps lost value and its credit rating was lowered, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the time of the bailout, testified on Jan. 27. Goldman Sachs was among AIG’s biggest counterparties.

Goldman Sachs Chief Financial Officer David Viniar has said that his firm’s stringent collateral agreements would have helped protect the firm against a default by AIG. Instead, a $182.3 billion taxpayer bailout of AIG ensured that Goldman Sachs and others were repaid in full.



  Extracting Collateral


Over the last three years, Goldman Sachs has extracted more collateral from counterparties in the $605 trillion over-the-counter derivatives markets, according to filings with the SEC.

The firm led by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein collected cash collateral that represented 57 percent of outstanding over-the-counter derivatives assets as of December 2009, while it posted just 16 percent on liabilities, the firm said in a filing this month. That gap has widened from rates of 45 percent versus 18 percent in 2008 and 32 percent versus 19 percent in 2007, company filings show.

“That’s classic collateral arbitrage,” said Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. in New York who previously worked as treasurer at Morgan Stanley and chief financial officer at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. “You always want to enter into something where you’re getting more collateral in than what you’re putting out.”



  Using the Cash


The banks get to use the cash collateral, said Robert Claassen, a Palo Alto, California-based partner in the corporate and capital markets practice at law firm Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP.

“They do have to pay interest on it, usually at the Fed funds rate, but that’s a low rate,” Claassen said.

Goldman Sachs’s $110 billion net collateral balance in December was almost three times the amount it had attracted from depositors at its regulated bank subsidiaries. The collateral could earn the bank an annual return of $439 million, assuming it’s financed at the current Fed funds effective rate of 0.15 percent and that half is reinvested at the same rate and half in two-year Treasury notes yielding 0.948 percent.

“We manage our collateral arrangements as part of our overall risk-management discipline and not as a driver of profits,” said Michael DuVally, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs.

He said that Bloomberg’s estimates of the firm’s potential returns on collateral were “flawed” and declined to provide further explanation.


  JPMorgan, Citigroup


JPMorgan received cash collateral equal to 57 percent of the fair value of its derivatives receivables after accounting for offsetting positions, according to data contained in the firm’s most recent annual filing. It posted collateral equal to 45 percent of the comparable payables, leaving it with a $37 billion net cash collateral balance, the filing shows.

In 2008 the cash collateral received by JPMorgan made up 47 percent of derivative assets, while the amount posted was 37 percent of liabilities. The percentages were 47 percent and 26 percent in 2007, according to data in company filings.

By contrast, New York-based Citigroup Inc., a bank that’s 27 percent owned by the U.S. government, paid out $11 billion more in collateral on over-the-counter derivatives than it collected at the end of 2009, a company filing shows.

Brian Marchiony, a spokesman for JPMorgan, and Alexander Samuelson, a spokesman for Citigroup, both declined to comment.



  Derivatives Market


The five biggest U.S. commercial banks in the derivatives market -- Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Co. -- account for 97 percent of the notional value of derivatives held in the banking industry, according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

In credit-default swaps, the world’s five biggest dealers are JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank AG and London-based Barclays Plc, according to a report by Deutsche Bank Research that cited the European Central Bank and filings with the SEC. Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan had combined revenue of $29.1 billion from trading derivatives and cash securities in the first nine months of 2009, according to Federal Reserve reports.

The U.S. Congress is considering bills that would require more derivatives deals be processed through clearinghouses, privately owned third parties that guarantee transactions and keep track of collateral and margin. A clearinghouse that includes both banks and hedge funds would erode the banks’ collateral balances, said Kevin McPartland, a senior analyst at research firm Tabb Group in New York.



  ‘Level Playing Field’


When contracts are negotiated between two parties, collateral arrangements are determined by the relative credit ratings of the two companies and other factors in the relationship, such as how much trading a fund does with a bank, McPartland said. When trades are cleared, the requirements have “nothing to do with credit so much as the mark-to-market value of your current net position.”

“Once you’re able to use a clearinghouse, presumably everyone’s on a level playing field,” he said.

Still, banks may maintain their advantage in parts of the market that aren’t standardized or liquid enough for clearing, McPartland said. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon and Goldman Sachs’s Blankfein both told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January that they support central clearing for all standardized
over-the-counter derivatives.

“The percentage of products that are suitable for central clearing is relatively small in comparison to the entire OTC derivatives market,” McPartland said.



  Bilateral Agreements


A report this month by the New York-based International Swaps & Derivatives Association found that 84 percent of collateral agreements are bilateral, meaning collateral is exchanged in two directions.

Banks have an advantage in dealing with asset managers because they can require collateral when initiating a trade, sometimes amounting to as much as 20 percent of the notional value, said Craig Stein, a partner at law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP in New York who represents hedge-fund clients.

JPMorgan’s filing shows that these initiation amounts provided the firm with about $11 billion of its $37.4 billion net collateral balance at the end of December, down from about $22 billion a year earlier and $17 billion at the end of 2007. Goldman Sachs doesn’t break out that category.

A bank’s net collateral balance doesn’t get included in its capital calculations and has to be held in liquid products because it can change quickly, according to an executive at one of the biggest U.S. banks who declined to be identified because he wasn’t authorized to speak publicly.


  Counterparty Demands


Counterparties demanding collateral helped speed the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, according to a New York Fed report published in January. Those that had posted collateral with Lehman were often in the same position as unsecured creditors when they tried to recover funds from the bankrupt firm, the report said.

“When the collateral is posted to a derivatives dealer like Goldman or any of the others, those funds are not segregated, which means that the dealer bank gets to use them to finance itself,” said Darrell Duffie, a professor of finance at Stanford University in Palo Alto. “That’s all fine until a crisis comes along and counterparties pull back and the money that dealer banks thought they had disappears.”


  ‘Greater Push Back’


While some hedge-fund firms have pushed for banks to put up more cash after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and other survivors of the credit crisis have benefited from the drop in competition.

“When the crisis started developing, I definitely thought it was going to be an opportunity for our fund clients to make some headway in negotiating, and actually the exact opposite has happened,” said Schulte Roth’s Stein. “Post-financial crisis, I’ve definitely seen a greater push back on their side.”

Hedge-fund firms that don’t have the negotiating power to strike two-way collateral agreements with banks have more to gain from a clearinghouse than those that do, said Stein. Regulators should encourage banks to post more collateral

to their counterparties to lower the impact of a single bank’s failure, according to the January New York Fed report. Pressure from regulators and a move to greater use of clearinghouses may mean the banks’ advantage has peaked.

“Before the financial crisis, collateral was very unevenly demanded and somewhat insufficiently demanded,” Stanford’s Duffie said. A clearinghouse “should reduce the asymmetry and raise the total amount of collateral.”




Update of Dec 2011
For an update on rehypothecation of hedge fund assets have a look at this article on nakedcapitalism.com

Tuesday, 9 March 2010

Gartmore Results for 2009 - Absolute Return Products Attract Capital

Gartmore's hedge fund range is well known, and indeed well-regarded as a whole. The reasons for that are evident from the table below which shows performance :




Note:Data is based on published NAV returns. Returns denominated in currency of the primary share class.



(1) AUM is net of performance fees accrued


(2)Annualised returns net of fees and commissions with dividends re-invested to December 2009
 
What is also interesting in the Gartmore results for 2009 is the growth in Absolute Return Funds
 









From a corporate perspective that 11 out of 14 hedge funds produced positive returns in 2009 bodes well, and that the funds in negative teritory for the year are the smaller ones also helps. 
 
Gartmore categorises absolute return funds as part of their mutual fund range. In 2009 the absolute return funds drew in £903m net, and the positive flows continued into 2010. In the first two months of this year Gartmore's absolute return funds had net inflows of £195m, and the company has launched two new absolute return funds in 2010. From a recent beginning the absolute return funds are now 5% of the firm's AUM, and importantly for cash flow, the absolute retun funds crystalise their perfromance fees quarterly. Last year absolute return fund contributed 10% of the firm's performance fees. Quite useful those absolute return funds, eh?

Thursday, 4 March 2010

PODCAST FOUR – CTA Beach Horizon


A Discussion with Head of Research of Beach Horizon, Dr. Paul Netherwood.
Dr. Netherwood spent four years in the Nineties in trading systems research and development at AHL (Adams, Harding and Lueck, now part of Man Group), and for the last 9 years he has been at Beach Capital Management and Beach Horizon LLP, a systematic fund management partnership. Beach Horizon is based in the City of London.

 

Clicking on the link will open a page containing the sound file - download or play in your browser



Part One (Link Here) (15 minutes)


 0.00 Introduction to Beach Horizon and sytematic CTAs
 5.50 Portfolio construction and diversification including milk and pork bellies
 9.20 Targets for outputs return and volatility
 10.50 Upside volatility
 11.55 Margin-to-equity as a proxy for risk

Part Two (Link Here) (13 minutes)

 0.00 The team - an advantage in being able to tap into a trader with a discretionary background for idea creation  and assessing research ideas.
 4.45 An FX research project
 6.20 Prioritising research, co-opting the sciences
7.35 Research productivity
10.00 People power - intellect is not scalable
12.05 Beyond trend-following - different frequencies

Part Three (Link Here) (8 minutes) 

0.00  Different time horizons of investors - a dominant frequency
1:06 Performance of CTAs in 2008
3.40 Performance in 2009
5.06 Current Drawdown - when will we see outperformance of CTAs? Influence of QE?
 

 

Drawdown Analysis for Beach Horizon May 2005 to December 2009















   

Source: Beach Horizon Database

 

My thanks go to Dr. Paul Netherwood for his contribution to this podcast.

Tuesday, 23 February 2010

Insight into European Hedge Funds from FSA Report

The FSA’s report, ‘Assessing possible sources of systemic risk from hedge funds’ was released today and is available from the FSA at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/hedge_funds.pdf. It offers some insights into leverage, margining, liquidity and the distribution of fund returns of the largest funds under the FSA's jurisdiction. The FSA regulates over three-quarters of Europe's hedge fund industry, so this is an insight into the whole of the European industry, by proxy.


Gross Exposure of London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds in October 2009




















  • There is a pronounced phenomena that fixed income funds (including credit L/S) need a larger gross to deliver alpha. Multi-strat funds typically have a fixed income sub-strategy. 
  • Global macro funds weren't particulalrly levered in October last year - maybe they were largely out of bonds? 
  • Interestingly, the classicly leveraged strategy of managed futures is unlevered according to the FSA's survey results.
  • London's L/S equity funds had a smaller gross than their US counterparts in October.


Fund and Portfolio Liquidity of London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds

























Average Margin Requirements for London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds






















  • These are first tier hedge fund management companies, so would not suffer first from changes to margining rules by prime brokers. So the stability of margin requirements shown in October 2008 is perhaps understandable for them alone. That the margin requirements went up subsequently even for the top tier hedge funds shows the (lack of) availability of credit in 2009.


Distribution of Fund Returns of London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds in 6 Months to Oct 2009














  • As much as anything else it is impressive how much the distribution of returns across the largest funds in the six months to October 2009 conforms to a (long) option-like payoff profile. Curtailing the downside and top-draw risk management is what investors in first tier funds expect and should get.


Change in Fund AUM of London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds over Six Months to October 2009













  • All funds sufferred redemptions in the first half of 2009. The biggest and best funds had inflows in the second half of the year, but some London-based managers such as Lansdowne had excellent investment perfromance too. Those that performed well in 2009 had inflows and returns contributing to the growth in AUM.



Fund Total Number of Positions of London's 50 Largest Hedge Funds














  • A few of the largest hedge funds in London have less than 50 positions in total.
  • Most of the largest hedge funds managed from London, or where the fund management company if overseen by the FSA (like Moore Capital and Walter Capital, the SAC subsidiary), have 100-500 positions.
  • Some of the multi-strategy funds engaged in statistical arbitrage or high frequency trading run portfolios with more than 5,000 positions. To put this in context there are around 3,000 different companies traded on the London Stock Exchange (excluding AIM).





source of all graphics: FSA

Monday, 22 February 2010

LGT stays overweight macro traders

Thomas Weber, head of Hedge Fund Investment, LGT Capital Partners and lead portfolio manager of Castle Alternative Invest, commented on the fund’s performance of up 12.6% in 2009 (in NAV terms).
  • Significant allocation to CTA/macro strategies provides diversification from equities and bond
  • Move from systematic traders to global macro managers aided outperformance in 2008/09
  • Portfolio remains focused on flexible, liquid, less correlated strategies

Weber says: “In early 2009 we moved CTA/macro allocation away from systematic traders and increased exposure to global macro managers, which helped the company outperform the HFR Fund of Funds Index for the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009. We remain overweight discretionary macro and underweight systematic traders because, at present, markets are not subject to major dislocations, which have been the prime opportunity for systematic and short term traders. More benign market conditions enable macro managers to prosper over their shorter term, technical counterparts.”



Friday, 19 February 2010

From the GLG Earnings Release - Flows, High Water Marks and the Outlook for CB Arbitrage

From the Full Year Statements for GLG Partners Inc.

Noam Gottesman, Chairman and Co-CEO of GLG said : “Encouragingly, AUM flows at GLG have turned definitively positive over the past six months and looking forward, I am confident that GLG remains well-positioned to be a leading beneficiary as industry flows expand."

4Q net inflows of $723 million, mostly reflecting interest in GLG's alternative strategy managed accounts,. Net inflows in the 3Q (across long only and hedge) were $216m.



Conference Call Extracts on Flows, High Water Marks and the Outlook for CB Arbitrage


Noam Gottesman
“In fact, we are seeing growing interest in GLG from both existing and potential clients. Our organic net flows were positive again in the fourth quarter, after turning positive in the third quarter, following six months of stabilizing trends. Importantly, the redemption wave that crested late in 2008 now appears well behind us.

"Further, though the pacing and scale of this next cycle of inflows remain difficult to forecast, we believe it has definitely begun. It is notable that we gained several significant new client relationships in the quarter, including among others, a prominent sovereign wealth fund and a European Insurance company.

"At the end of the fourth quarter we had approximately $7.5 billion in AUM above water within 5% of high watermark, part of a potential 12.5 billion in performance fee eligible assets under management. We have another 0.8 billion in AUM within five to 10% of the respective high watermark.

"I'm strongly encouraged by the flows we have seen during the second half of 2009 and in the early weeks of 2010."



Jeff Rojek, CFO

At the end of December, we had roughly 7.5 billion out of a possible 12.5 billion of performance fee eligible AUM, above or within 5% of their respective high watermarks. These numbers include AUM, special asset vehicles and other liquidating strategies.

Broken down by strategy, approximately 3.2 billion of our alternative AUM, 0.9 billion of our long-only AUM, and 1.7 billion of our 130/30 strategies or similar AUM is above water. Also, approximately, 0.4 billion of our alternative AUM, 0.2 billion of our long-only AUM, and 1.1 billion of our 130/30 strategies or similar AUM is within 5% or less of their respective high watermarks.

Of the remaining five billion of AUM under water, 1.8 billion is in alternative strategies and 3.2 billion is in our long-only strategy. Briefly again even further 0.4 billion of alternative AUM and 0.4 billion of long-only AUM is between five and 10% of their respective high water marks. 0.8 billion of alternative AUM and 1.7 billion of long-only AUM between ten and 30% of their high water marks. While 0.7 billion of alternative AUM and as 1 billion of long-only AUM is more than 30% below the high water marks.



Q&As


(A - Noam Gottesman, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer): We're very encouraged by what we're seeing in the pipeline. The inflow cycle as we mentioned, it's hard to sort of guage the pacing, the magnitude but we're actually seeing it pretty much across the board, definitely seeing a lot of alternative interest now, and whereas in the previous few months, there were some alternative but mainly traditional. But we are - we're seeing very strong flows into the Long-Short products, we're seeing strong flows into emerging market. And convertible, we're seeing very good interest in the UCITS III product,

...A large part of the 4Q flows were from sovereign investors in long only mandates.


A - Noam Gottesman, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer): Yes, generally, I think, people are definitely allocating. There is no question. There is certainly an awful lot of interest, and I think they're not doing it because they're bored. I think they've got money to put to work, and alternatives definitely delivered. And I think the prospects are looking bright for the industry right now.



(Q - Roger Freeman): Are you finding that you're coming in as a result of manager substitution or are you coming in as an additional manager?

(A - Noam Gottesman, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer): I think it's both. I think the people sat on their hands for much of last year. They redeemed in some places, but they sat on their hands. They're just - I'm not really seeing - it's hard for me to gauge where it's coming from, but it's definitely coming.

… The alternative assets continued to be at full alternative fees, we are not seeing any real pricing pressure there.



(Q - Roger Freeman): What are your thoughts on the convert market outlook? I think, you mentioned there was strong interest in the fourth quarter. Issuance seems to have been light so far this year relative to what people were expecting. Do you see a lot of issuance coming down the pike, and is that a key to driving returns and flows in that area?

(A - Noam Gottesman, Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer): I think we're still very positive on the convertible market and we were for - we have been, as you know. And it’s a market that's done exceptionally well. Our convertible funds - our convertible arbitrage funds - have continued to perform very strongly, including in January where the convertible arbitrage fund, I think, was up close to 9%.

We think issuance will continue. And we think that new deals are going to have to come cheap, and I think it's going to provide opportunities. And the volatility in the market should be very beneficial. So we do continue to feel strongly positive on it. We also believe that there would be a large M&A flow that continues, which will also drive new issuance.

GLG Global Convertible Fund versus Bloomberg Active Convertible Index

Thursday, 11 February 2010

Industry Flows – Inference From Och Ziff Results Announced Today

Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC is a quoted company (Ticker:OZM), and as such we may get some insight into industry flows from their disclosures.


For sure, Och-Ziff is only truly representative of hedge fund management companies of its size, tenure, quality, and track record. In each of these regards OZM stands out. It is emblematic of the track record of Och-Ziff that, since the inception of the flagship fund, the Och-Ziff Master Fund has returned 14.5% compound (net of fees) to investors, which equates to a Sharpe ratio of 1.83.




Source: Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC

Och Ziff funds, like 60% of all hedge funds, hit new high-water marks in 2009. That, and by inference the returns achieved in 2009, and the size and quality of operations of Och-Ziff Capital Management drew in a disproportionate amount of industry flows last year. The big got bigger as a proportion of hedge fund industry assets in 2009 – this was not just a flight-to-safety argument, but every hedge fund in the world had capacity for new capital in the first half of last year as redemptions given in late 2008 came into full effect. So the biggest and best benefitted particularly because many of the hedge funds in that subset of funds had been hard closed to all investors for some time. Why not invest with Tudor, Moore and Och-Ziff if you can?


• Och-Ziff’s assets under management were $23.1 billion as of December 31, 2009, 4% higher than the $22.3 billion in assets under management as of September 30, 2009 but 14% lower than the $27.0 billion in assets under management as of December 31, 2008. The $3.9 billion year-over-year decrease was driven by net outflows of $8.1 billion, partially offset by performance-related appreciation of $4.2 billion during the year.


• During the 2009 fourth quarter, the $802 million increase in assets under management was driven by performance-related appreciation of approximately $497 million and net inflows of approximately $305 million.


• Assets under management as of January 1, 2010 were $23.5 billion, which reflected January 1, 2010 capital inflows (net of redemption requests received for December 31, 2009) of approximately $400 million.


• Estimated assets under management of $24.0 billion as of February 1, 2010, reflecting capital inflows of approximately $250 million and performance-related appreciation of approximately $250 million


The point to emphasise is that sequence of net investor flows for Och-Ziff went from $305m for the 4th quarter, to $400m for January 1st, to $250m for February 1st 2010.

Dan Och, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Och-Ziff, said “We believe that the capital inflow cycle for the hedge fund industry has begun, and that our assets under management will grow over time. Institutional investors remain extremely focused on manager selection, and we remain confident that our track record, infrastructure and demonstrated alignment of interests with our fund investors will continue to differentiate us in the marketplace.”

Dan Och’s statement about their own prospects of drawing investor flow might be true, but if Och-Ziff had smaller flows for February1st than those of January 1st, then the industry experience is likely to be significantly less positive for January and February flows.


HFN reported that there was a very small net outflow from the industry in December 2009, at a time when Och-Ziff was experiencing inflows. Och-Ziff inflows have moderated since. Does that mean that the industry has had further outflows in January?

Wednesday, 10 February 2010

Performance of Equity Hedge Funds versus Equity Markets This Year

Investors don't need investments in equity hedge funds on a multi-month basis when equity markets are in a multi-year bull market. At the margin equity hedge fund holdings would moderate a monthly return series of pure fully-invested equity market exposures. In prolonged bull phases equity hedge holdings would produce slightly lower losses in the down months, during the pauses that refresh in major bull markets. But equity hedge fund exposure will not produce positive absolute returns in down months of a prolonged bull. This is shown in the first graphic below.

The first graphic (courtesy of Bloomberg LLP) shows the price series and relative returns of HFR's Investible Equity Hedge Index and the S&P500. HFRXEH is a good proxy of US-based equity hedge managers, and has the distinct advantage for hedge fund watchers of being a daily return series. The top half of the graphic shows two line charts for the two indices. The green shaded part of the lower half of the first graphic shows the relative performance of equity hedge funds against the equity market. When the line in the lower half moves up equity hedge funds are out-performing equity markets, and vice versa.


So the lower half of the first graphic shows that equity hedge funds under-perfromed the multi-year equity bull market of 2003 to August 2007, then out-performed the equity market into the market low of March 2009.

The second graphic here tells the same story over the last 17 months. Simply put, equity hedge fund managers as a whole cannot match a market rally of 50%-plus from the low that turns on a dime.


Amongst the questions I want to address here is how have equity hedge funds done this year, and what should investors in equity hedge funds have expected, given the market conditions experienced.

Over the year-to-date (up to and including Monday the 8th of February) the HFR Equity Hedge Index has fallen 1.6%, and over that time the S&P has fallen 5.2%.  There have been two distinct phases for the equity market in the year to date period: stocks rallied 3.1% from the start of the year to the S&P high on the 19th of January, and then stocks fell 8.1% to the 8th of January. The high for the HFR hedge fund index came a week before the price peak of the S&P500: the inference being that equity hedge managers were already reigning back net equity market exposure as the market approached its peak. Further, the relative movements of the hedge fund index to the stock market index sugggest that in the first two weeks of the year equity hedge fund managers as an aggregate had a net market exposure of around 80%. From the stock market peak on the 19th of January to the 8th of February the decline in equity hedge fund NAVs suggests that the net exposure of equity hedge funds in America was just under 60%.

The returns from equity hedge funds this year will have come from both stock selection and net market beta, and at the index level it is not possible to break that down (ask your manager for details). The evidence from the year to date numbers so far is that equity hedge managers have reduced their net exposures going into the fall in stock prices and mitigated the losses of the capital of their investors through so doing.


Addendum: The BoA/Merrill Lynch Hedge Fund Monitor for 8th February estimated that (globally) equity long/short funds had cut market exposure to a net 27-28%  in the first week of February. If so that would be the lowest net exposure to markets since May of 2009.

Friday, 5 February 2010

Problems and Solutions in Investing with China-based Hedge Funds

This blog has been running for four months and this is the first posting to mention China. At the start of the year as strategists and economists gave outlooks for 2010 it was all about China. Anthony Bolton, after a career as a London-based fund manager at Fidelity dedicated to UK equities, has come out of retirement to run a Chinese equity fund and is to be based in Hong Kong. As a destination for investment, the popularity of China-focused funds is certainly on the rise. Sales of China-focused funds via Fidelity’s fund platform, FundsNetwork, increased by 59% in 2009, while sales into Fidelity’s China Focus Fund alone increased by 239%. That is how enticing China is as an investment destination. However, whilst  there has been a China theme to many investment portfolios, and the largest hedge fund companies have opened Hong Kong or mainland China offices, Chinese dedicated hedge funds have been something of a side show in the hedge fund industry. This reflects that China is much more developed as a manufacturing centre than a service and financial centre.

So China is recognised as  representing the largest global growth opportunity on a multi-year basis, but immature as far as the financial sector and capital markets are concerned. The Chinese equity markets represent a rich opportunity set, as do all frontier markets, but in this particular case, partly through cultural considerations, they can be difficult to access successfully and sustainably and with as much confidence in the execution as in the high concept. The practical difficulties were recently addressed by dedicated hedge fund site http://www.chinahedge.com.cn/, using comments by GFIA as a springboard.

The rest of this post is in two parts: the article from Chinahedge, which has been re-written but not changed in shape or substance, and in part two a full, considered response from London-based Fund of Funds manager Caliburn Capital Partners, which targeted exposure to the China theme some years ago, and which has supported exposure in the region through a Singapore office.

Part One - The Problems

The investability of mainland China based managers has become an issue, as reflected in the decision by Singapore-based research firm GFIA to stop covering and investing in hedge funds based in mainland China. It has largely shifted its coverage to western-trained managers based in Hong Kong. As an example of the issues investors face it cites that on a number of occasions China-based hedge funds would not reveal the identity of fund backers or the background of portfolio managers.



Compliance issues


The majority of offshore Chinese hedge funds are run from Hong Kong and the mainland China cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen, with very few in Beijing. For those with a Hong Kong office, almost all of them are Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission-registered.


"At the very beginning of the due diligence process for investors allocating to China hedge funds investors should check to see if the investment manager is regulated, if the fund they manage have independent directors, if the fund is administered independently by a well known firm, and if the firm is audited independently by a top grade auditor." Andy Mantel, founder and CIO of Pacific Sun Investment Management (HK) Ltd, told China Hedge by phone. Andy is one of few offshore Greater China hedge fund managers who is non-Chinese but is fluent in Mandarin having been in the Greater China Region for about 20 years. “Basically all mainland headquartered hedge fund managers fail this initial due diligence test.”


Based on the statistics of China Hedge Fund Managers (Onshore) Database complied by China Hedge, most of the mainland managers (about 200 managers) are only managing local Chinese hedge funds denominated in RMB which are not accessible by global investors. Around 10% of them are running offshore Greater China hedge funds as well. Some have HKSFC-registered operation. Only a few of them have no HKSFC-registered operations which may cause some compliance issues.



Transparency and disclosure issue


GFIA mentioned in its report that those mainland-based managers show "a lack fundamental transparency and openness." It is an issue with some mainland-based fund managers that they are not willing to disclose their real holdings, and they do not have a disciplined risk management either, according to Kaikai Hua, director of a Shanghai-based wealth management company. He said, “normally they have a bet on one or two stocks or PE investments, and cover up the big loss or a liquidity problem until the stocks stop trading, or the IPO fails.”

Before selecting China managers for their US-based institutional clients, Bill Hunnicutt strictly required the Chinese managers must be willing to accept complete portfolio transparency which is now mandatory post-Madoff. Bill is the President of Hunnicutt & Co., LLC which is a placement agency based in the US. Bill said this means showing a current portfolio upon request. “Some larger US institutions require daily transparency via a dedicated website, while others will accept transparency via 3rd party vendors who then provide a general summary of the portfolio to the client.”



Business and cultural differences


There are clear cultural differences between local managers and global investors. Most local managers come from mainland mutual funds and securities firms. They are accustomed to running funds to a local standard, not those expected by global investors. “If the local managers do not tell you the companies they hold because they do not want others copy the idea. Knowing something early than the market is an important way for them to make money", Kaikai said.


The cultural differences may be exacerbated by communication problems. Most local managers are not comfortable to talk and write in English, so, the email reporting and newsletter that foreign investors in hedge funds expect may not be produced on a timely basis, if at all. “They would rather not say anything than express something badly. It takes a while for investors to fully communicate with these managers.” Kaikai said.


So local Chinese managers have something to learn in terms of the normal global practices and standards of running a hedge fund, as recognised by international investors. It has been suggested that mainland Chinese managers of hedge funds would benefit from getting together on a regular basis to share some thoughts of running a hedge fund business – a draft practice for participants would follow. Some managers recognize that there is a trend of increasing allocation to China-based managers, and in response they have recruited Chinese partners who are Western-educated and/or have worked for Western companies so that they can acquire that necessary knowledge about the standards expected by global investors.



Changing regulated status


The current Chinese law has regulated Chinese mutual funds, but these regulations do not apply to onshore Chinese hedge funds. According to MarketWatch published by Citi Securities and Investment Services dated 17 December 2009, the mutual fund law review workgroup, set up by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, has reached an agreement to include privately-raised funds as regulated mutual funds in the revised Mutual Fund Law.


Li, Zhenning, Chairman of Shanghai Rising Fund Management and the member of the mutual fund law review workgroup suggested that the regulator release licenses on privately-raised funds (commonly called local hedge funds) in the future. Investors, thus, can expect better regulation of local hedge funds in areas such as transparency issue and information disclosure.



Comparative advantage of Chinese-speaking CIOs


”Some local CIOs are sound managers. They know what they are doing, and what risk they face. Despite the lack of transparency and absence of rigid risk control systems, mainland-based managers have a big advantage in that they know the market well. They are more alert to the growth engines in the market, as well as problems in the companies. They spend more time talking to people in the street, and ask what they think of a product. It’s much easier for them to get access to companies too,” Kaikai said.



To combine both HK and mainland managers


“Hong Kong is by far the best place to manage a China fund. Aside from the unparalleled infrastructure and regulatory environment, the free flow of instant, uncensored information is vital when making investment decisions.” Andy Mantel said. “Research activities on the mainland can only add value if it is a supplementary research and information gathering office in support of the manager's headquarters,” Mantel emphasized.”


Kaikai Hua states that Western-trained managers based in Hong Kong have a different strategy. Most of their holdings are big names and liquid stocks. They perform better in a bear market or when market is in a correction. And they have a better understanding of tools for hedging. “We see that one side are stock pickers, and the others are portfolio manager.” Hua suggests that clients combine both, so that they can enjoy the advantages each offer in accessing the growth of Chinese market.



Chinese hedge funds are growing


There is a strong case to be made that the Chinese hedge fund sector is becoming more significant within the global hedge fund industry. Many institutional investors have started to monitor and even allocate to Chinese hedge funds in their global portfolios. “We should not neglect the China market” is the common belief of most global investors.


The booming equity market has helped the growth of industry assets. The industry recorded encouraging growth figures last year. Chinese onshore hedge fund managers launched 242 products in 2009, according to a report by Chengdu, Sichuan-based Sinolink Securities Co Ltd. The average size for every fund was about 90 million yuan ($13.2m), the report said. The 151 non-structured hedge funds returned 54% on average in 2009. As the end of 2009, the local China hedge fund industry reached around RMB 50 billion ($7.4bn). Zhang Jianhui, Director of Fund Research with Sinolink Securities, said at the Sinolink Hedge Fund Forum last Saturday in Beijing that the hedge fund industry of China would manage about RMB 100 billion as at the end of 2010.



Part Two - The Solutions


Thank you for giving us the opportunity to respond to Peter Douglas’s comments. Whilst we acknowledge that Peter is well respected in the industry and has a long track record as a specialist on the Asian hedge fund industry as a whole, we would take issue with his view that mainland based managers are not transparent enough for investors to assess them properly from a qualitative perspective.



For the sake of clarity, what we mean by “mainland based managers” are those where the Portfolio Manager is generally based in China, may or may not have a Western background or speak very good English, but will have a Hong Kong office (or other location outside the mainland) and will be registered with the SFC in Hong Kong (or equivalent in other jurisdictions). This group includes some of the most well known and longest established Greater China hedge funds and all of our comments below are based on this group of managers. (There is a second group of mainland based managers who don’t have an investment management company outside of the mainland but who offer offshore products. Caliburn does not invest in this second group of managers because the law is not clear if mainland based funds offering offshore funds should be classified as Permanent Establishments, which would mean the fund and firm would be subject to tax. Currently we are seeing the market leaders in China’s mainland fund management industry, who are in the process of launching offshore products, all setting up offices outside of the mainland in Hong Kong.)


Bearing in mind the definition above, we have built an extensive peer group of mainland based managers who we monitor and from whom we receive regular updates. In our view, some of the strongest Chinese research teams from both a bottom up and top down perspective are mainland based. Their research edge comes from their ability to pay significantly more than the established, large local mutual funds so they can hire the best research analysts. We also find that in these teams there are more analysts with direct industry as well as buy or sell side research experience which provides an additional research edge.


These managers generally provide monthly reporting which is of a high standard with good portfolio level data, and they are happy to speak about the portfolio composition and their market views in some detail. If there is a problem it may be that some of the larger managers ($300m AUM or above) may be reluctant to offer transparency to other than significant investors. Equally, bottom up stock pickers may be reticent to elaborate on their rationale for individual and current stock picks. However both of these observations can be made of hedge funds in general and are not particular to China. In general we do not encounter these difficulties with the majority of funds. Clearly, full transparency is always available through a managed account with most mainland based managers. Of course, just as in the Western hedge fund industry investors will again need to meet a certain minimum investment size to take advantage of this option.


Of the three mainland based managers with whom we are currently invested, one provides us with probably the greatest transparency of any manager that we follow, including providing the full portfolio twice a month and an enormous depth of insight directly from the CEO and senior investment team. From the remaining two we receive monthly portfolio information with very good transparency such that we are able to establish and monitor all of the key risks and sources of return of the funds.


There is no question that communication is not always easy with mainland based managers. There are often cultural and language difficulties to overcome and few are polished presenters. It is therefore important to have Mandarin speaking analysts but it is not just about language. For Caliburn as a thematic investor, research does not start with the manager; we do a lot of work to understand the underlying market and investment opportunity. This includes attendance at industry and corporate conferences as well as independent meetings with regional thought leaders. The natural result of these activities is that our research team is armed with a good understanding of the Chinese macroeconomic situation, policy news and sector news together with a general knowledge of stocks in key sectors. With this as background it is possible to establish a better relationship with managers. Our thematic work supports very specific and focused questioning and with this approach we have been very pleased with the level of disclosure we have received to date.


In relation to getting comfort with the risk management processes at these firms, as with all peer groups there are funds where we trust the risk management and there are funds where we remain cautious or sceptical. Without question a significant commitment of resources and time is required to regularly communicate with the funds and ask the right risk related questions to form a view. From an operational point of view, the mainland based funds that we have approved for investment have top tier independent 3rd party service providers (administrator, custodian, prime broker, and auditor) and in this respect reflect the best practices of their non-Asian counterparts.


In terms of performance in stress periods, broadly speaking most of the China based managers are bottom up investors and they did not protect the downside in 2008 as much as we would have hoped, though poor performance over this period is a common failing from across the hedge fund industry regardless of geography. We were pleased to see a number of managers sticking to a disciplined valuation approach which meant they were already running low exposure levels before the crisis unfolded. In general terms our invested China managers fared better in the second half of 2008 than in the first half of 2008 and China managers as a group performed much better than their BRIC peers over 2008 as a whole. Importantly, a number of China managers who lost 20% or more in 2008 subsequently made significant improvements to their risk management and their adherence to risk disciplines and this has served them well in months such as January 2010, during which they cut exposure and balanced their portfolio much more effectively than during the difficult Chinese markets of early 2008.


In conclusion, overall the standard clichés apply: you get out what you put in. We commit significant time and resource to achieving a detailed understanding of each manager’s approach. We routinely make multiple trips to interview a manager in his / her office and follow up these on-site visits with a number of conference calls before deciding to bring a manager forward for discussion at our internal approval committee. There are barriers to entry and the investment opportunities may be less accessible as a consequence. However this can make the opportunities more interesting and the barriers can be overcome with a commitment of analytical time and a consistency of approach that reassures the manager that you are serious and there for the long term.

Richard Howard
Caliburn Capital Partners

Friday, 29 January 2010

Podcast 3 - A Q&A with Two Third Party Marketers of Hedge Funds

Click on the emboldened header (e.g Part One) to link to the sound file. Clicking on the link will open a page containing the sound file - download or play in your browser

Part One
(8 minutes)
Clicking on the link above will open a new window with two choices available: download the podcast or play the podcast.

1.50 What are Third Party Marketers?

2.23 How was 2009 for Third Party Marketers?

4.05 Databases over Third Party Marketers?

6.00 Transactions versus Relationships

7.01 Repeat Visits to Targets

7.58 Decisions by Committees

(13 minutes)
0.00 Branding in the Hedge Fund Business

2.48 Marketing Materials

4.16 Clarity of Materials over Logo Design

5.10 Boiled-Down Presentations

6.37 The Last Two Minutes of the Presentation

7.13 Matching Material to Territory and Investor type

8.22 Establishing Trust

8.55 Initial Assessment of Manager

9.40 Friends & Family Money First

10.47 More Established Manager for Institutional Investors

11.19 The Sourcing of Managers

(6 minutes)
0.00 Next Stage after Identifying the Managers to Work With

1.50 Marketing Due Diligence

3.04 The Sweet Spot Now

5.18 Strategies to Appeal in 2010



My Thanks go to James Palmer of Red Sky Capital Solutions (redskycapsol.com)

And Barry Rogers of Alternative Investment Management (AIM) Partners (research@aimpartners.co.uk)

for their contributions to the discussion podcast above.

Sunday, 24 January 2010

Excess Supply of Emerging Managers to Come?

One of the consequences of the growth of institutionalisation of the hedge fund business is that it has become a lot harder for small and start-up hedge fund managers to get commercial traction. In the late Nineties it seemed that a manager only had to turn up with a credible background and they could launch with $30 to 50m. In the early Noughties it was still fairly easy to set up and it was quite common for a large wealth management company or fund of hedge funds to put a manager they believed in into business. From 2003 onwards the bar was raised for start-ups – managers had to come to potential backers with much more of a complete package, including a preference for two portfolio managers and an analyst or two. "We expect start-ups to have a headcount of five or six," was a typical quotation at the time. It was not impossible to get going on either a bigger or smaller scale, but if it was smaller it was odds-against.

In the period 2005-2007 asset flows into the hedge fund industry became the dominant driver. The consequences included a break-away pack of winners amongst allocators of capital to hedge funds. The flows of new capital were dominated by institutional assets such that institutional imperatives dominated the processes and mind-sets of funds of funds businesses. Ticket sizes became bigger generally. And this was a problem to new and smaller funds – as investors in hedge funds commonly have prudence rules that limit the percentage of assets of a fund they can represent. In this era the second generation manager was the most successful route to hedge fund launches. This was a very safe route for the middle men of the business – as many more of the boxes could be ticked at launch, particularly if the second generation manager stayed under the same roof. The same can be said where additional strategies were launched by the management company for a successful large hedge fund.

Times since the middle of 2008 have been tougher for newly launched funds. There were far fewer of them, but redemptions across the industry made things very difficult. The outflows of capital across all funds left capacity at great and very good managers. Logically the first flows into the industry went to the best managers with available capacity, which was all of them.

New Supply
Late into 2009 the word was that the reining back of capital at investment banks, but across the sell-side generally, was going to compel an outflow of talent into the hedge fund world. Investment management consultancy Laven Partners have said that they are seeing a trend for traders from banks to launch new businesses, partly reflecting concerns about remuneration levels within banks. They say that many traders working as the number 2 or 3 portfolio manager in a fund feel that now is the time to strike out on their own. In particular this is true in funds that are well below their high water mark. Other service providers confirm the trend - prime brokerage departments were said to be running longer lists of newly formed funds coming to market. For example Morgan Stanley reported a 10% increase in prime brokerage clients in the 4th quarter. So 2010 is expected to build on the recovery in launches of the second half of 2009.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that for Europe at least, the first half of 2010 will be a busier again for new launches. Three quarters of Europe's hedge funds are in the U.K., and in the U.K. the management companies of the investment advisor have to be approved by the F.S.A. Start-up consultancies say that they have a good pipeline of new and completely independent managers, and the workload at the FSA confirms this. In early 2008 I was involved in a fund launch, and the authorisation part of the process took around 4 weeks with the F.S.A. Whilst it is true that the FSA is subjecting applications to greater scrutiny, that firms are being told by the FSA that applications are piling up, and that the average processing time is approaching 12 weeks, reflecting an increasing number of fund management company and fund launches. Rob Mirsky of Laven Partners told me that the FSA is certainly still backed up - even getting a case officer at the FSA at the moment is a struggle, he says.

Demand
So what kind of demand environment are these management companies and new hedge funds going to launch into? Alternative investment data specialist Preqin surveyed investors in hedge funds in the last couple of months to find out about their attitudes to emerging managers. The Preqin survey suggests that only 29% of investors would consider investing in a hedge fund with less than $100m in AUM. Further, they suggest that, in the main, funds of funds are the only investor type to get involved. So a principal difficulty faced by emerging managers is that they are mostly trying to attract capital from a type of investor that remains under commercial pressure itself because of its own investment returns and capital flows. 

Flows at the industry level, having turned positive in April/May of last year, have reversed in the short term. After seven straight eight up months up to November last year, flows turned negative in December 2009, according to HFN. In October investors committed $16bn of new capital to hedge funds, and in November investors subscribed a further $26bn. However, in December investors redeemed $4bn from hedge funds, according to analysis of the HFN database. Given the emerging bear phase in equity markets, it is not expected that capital flows into hedge funds will resume with force until later in 2010.


Industry level flows can be very important to new funds. Funds of funds went through a lot of fire-fighting in the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009. The senior staff that have the ability to make seeding decisions or can decide to back an early-stage manager were completely occupied with existing investments (and keeping their firms afloat) during that twelve month period, and only emerged with some degrees of freedom in their management choices very recently. When industry flows are consistently positive again funds of funds will be able to get on the front foot in decision-making. In the aggregate, funds of funds have barely had any positive flows yet, even when single managers were gathering assets again in the second half of 2009. So the major source of capital for small and new hedge funds has been, and will continue to be, constrained for capital and senior management time in the first half of 2010, with a few small exceptions.


The small exceptions are funds and funds of funds that seed and invest in new managers on a dedicated basis. Seeders have been making capital commitments, and are well invested - many are looking to raise additional capital before they can back any more new funds. There are some new entrants: United Investment Managers and Aptima Capital Management have both recently announced plans to launch fund of hedge fund vehicles focused on emerging manager hedge funds. They should both have plenty of choice, at least in Europe.



Addendum I: according to magazine AR, the assets garnered by new funds declined 36% to $14.89 billion in 2009 —the worst showing in years. In total, new funds in 2009 that were managing a minimum of $50 million in assets by year-end amassed a mere $14.89 billion, the lowest on record, according to the biannual survey by AR, which has been tracking the biggest new fund launches since 2004. That is 36% less than $23.17 billion in 2008—a figure that was helped by two mega launches from Goldman Sachs that raised a combined $7 billion—and 63% less than in 2004, when assets garnered by the biggest new funds peaked at $40 billion.

While the number of new fund launches in 2009—53 funds met AR's criteria for inclusion—came close to those in 2008, the average assets are lower, and the number of funds managing more than $1 billion has collapsed. Only two funds were able to end 2009 with $1 billion in assets or more, as compared with 2008, which boasted five funds managing that amount. 



Addendum II: Edgar Senior, head of capital services at Credit Suisse in London, commented in February 2010: "It is harder to launch new funds than in the past, so existing hedge funds that have capital to deploy and have built out the institutional infrastructure have the luxury of choice." (source: Financial News)