The Big Hedge Fund Stories from 2011

Although individual news items can have can have historical significance (such as story 1 below) the effort here is more to point to the themes and trends at work in the hedge fund industry last year. Here are my top stories for 2011:

Bruce Kovner

1.  Big Name Retirements – two of the best known names in the business stopped running other people’s money in 2011. George Soros turned Soros Fund Management into a family office in the middle of the year, allowing him to have some involvement, even if he is not the CIO at 81 years of age. 

Bruce Kovner has handed over the investment reins at Caxton Associates to Andrew Law, and the macro maven is retiring. The extent of his future involvement in the $9.4bn firm is not clear at this point.

2. Regulatory Body Success in Prosecutions – after much effort over the years, regulators in the United States got some hedge fund scalps of significance in 2011. After the SEC was criticised for its handling of allegations against Pequot Capital Management, the Securities and Exchange Commission need the conspicuous success it achieved in the convictions against the employees and owners of Galleon Group. Galleon founder Raj  Rajaratnam was convicted of insider trading and sentenced to 11 years in jail in October. Galleon trader Zvi Goffer, who controlled two insider dealing rings, was sentenced to 10 years in prison and ordered to pay more than $10 million in forfeitures. 

The other conspicuous success was the case brought against Chip Skowron, portfolio manager at FrontPoint Partners.  The healthcare stock specialist was convicted of insider trading in August and sentenced to 5 years in prison.  

3. A Hedge Fund Winner From The Euro Crisis – that classic global macro management can still be effective was demonstrated by Kyle Bass (and Hugh Hendry) last year.  Kyle Bass, the principal of Hayman Capital Partners, made capital (both monetary and reputational) out of the sub-prime mortgage imbroglio of 2007-8. It required patience and the ability to structure the trade right. Having demonstrated that trait and that ability in making great returns then, in 2008, Kyle Bass went on to talk about the potential for the indebtedness of some European countries to become an issue of significance.  He also identified that the long-dated credit default swaps were a great way to give low cost of carry and a big pay-off.  Bass’ patience and insight were rewarded in returns when the structural flaws of the European project became clear to everyone in 2011.

The classic global macro set-up of a structural imbalance and an option like pay-off was also successfully used by another contrarian, Hugh Hendry.  Hendry shares with Kyle Bass a wariness of  fiat currencies, but his pay off in 2011 came from sharing the trait of patience. The manager of the Eclectica Fund had pointed out some problems with the phenomena of Chinese growth in 2008, and in 2010 he began last year to short highly-cyclical Japanese corporate credits with high exposure to Chinese demand. The Eclectica Fund was up over 12% for the year by early December of last year.

4. King Quants Come Back – several of the hedge fund industry leaders made money for their investors applying quantitative techniques to markets, but the crowns of these kings of the algorithms have been tarnished by the aftermath of the quant shock of August 2007.  The archetype has been the Goldman Sachs Global Alpha fund. The two founders of the research process behind the product, Mark Carhart and Raymond Iwanowski, left Goldmans in 2009, and the fund itself was closed in the fourth quarter of 2011.

But not every quant outfit has followed a route of inexorable decline.  It was commented here last year (see this article) that Renaissance Technologies, founded by Jim Simons, was back on form, and the Renaissance flowering was sustained into 2011. The Renaissance Institutional Equities Fund International Series B was up 32.47% through the end of November 2011. 

The quant turnaround of 2011 was D.E. Shaw & Company. The firm had had a rough time post credit crunch – for a longer exposition of the decline in assets see this article.  Asset growth is a function of returns, and returns for 2011 were excellent at D.E. Shaw:  the firm’s multi-strategy Oculus fund was up 18.3% for 2011 (through the end of November), and the flagship Composite Fund was up 3.8% over the same period. AUM at D.E. Shaw went from $14bn at the end of 2010 to $16.5bn in the 4Q of 2011.

5. Closing to New Capital Reflecting Industry Concentration - the big have continued to get bigger in 2011, just as they have previously. But in 2011 the long-term trend was reflected in a phenomenon that was welcomed back like discovering an old friend who was out of contact for a long while – closing to new capital.

An early indicator in the year came when Cevian Capital announced that they were capping Cevian Capital II. That produced a wry smile of recognition for the return of the phenomenon, but it came to feel like it was contagious when indications came in May from SAC Capital Advisors that it was considering closing to new money (the actual cut-off point was August 2011), and in the same month Daniel Loeb closed Third Point Partners to new money with AUM of over $7bn. Good examples of the way flows were directed came in Europe at CQS and in the States at Sandler Capital Management. 

   

In June 2011 CQS announced it was closing the CQS ABS Fund to new money. But what was more indicative was that the firm's total assets had almost doubled over the previous year-and-a-half ( to around $11 billion). Inflows at the aggregate level stopped half way through the year, amid the turmoil in Europe, but at the micro level the announcements kept on coming. In October New York-based Sandler Capital Management announced a six moratorium on new capital to its long/short hedge funds while it digested a tripling of assets over the previous 18 months.

Newer and smaller firms were also closing to new money (Edoma Partners, JAT Capital Management and Taylor Woods, for example), but the increasing concentration in the industry was reflected more by the announcements by the brand name managers. The news flow on major manager closings continued to the end of the year as Viking Global Investors announced it was closing Andreas Halvorsen’s flagship fund, Viking Global Equities, to additional capital.

6. The Volcker Rule Leads To Big Trader-Led Launches – the Volker Rule separating prop trading from the rest of investment banking came into law in July 2010, and put real juice into the launch calendar in 2011. Given the lead times to set up businesses, it was inevitable that the impact on the hedge fund industry would come in 2011, and many in prime brokerages have stated that they have seen the best quality pipeline in years as a result. Here are some of the more notable ones.

The epitome of launches from former prop traders was Hong Kong-based Azentus Capital, set up by Morgan Sze, who had headed Goldman Sachs Principal Strategies Group there.  The fund launched with a billion dollars in April, an unusually large day-one size, but very unusual in Asia.  And in an echo of the glory days of the hedge fund world, the Azentus fund doubled in size in four months and closed to new money.

A notable launch by a prop trader in 2011 was by Tony Hall – a trader with a good reputation. In his last year at Credit Suisse he had generated one of the most profitable books ever seen at the bank.  Working with the Duet Group he launched a commodities focused hedge fund in early 2011 which was up over 27% after 10 months.  Avantium Investment Management was founded by a team of executives from Deutsche Bank headed by Kay Haigh. Having traded emerging markets for the bank, they launched their Avantium Liquid EM Macro Master Fund onto the world in October.   

Another fund launched to invest in commodity markets came from Taylor Woods, a management company set up by a 7-strong team of former traders at Credit Suisse led by Beau Taylor. With launch capital of $150m from Blackstone the Taylor Woods Master Fund made positive returns in 2011 by engaging in commodity arbitrage, particularly in energy markets. 

A fund launch from ex-prop traders which reflected another trend for start-ups in the industry was Benros Capital Partners in London.  The principals of the firm, Daniele Benatoff and Ariel Roskis, are   alumni of Goldman Sachs who launched their European event-driven fund in the 2Q of 2011 with backing from a firm seasoned in the hedge fund industry. Stockholm’s Brummer and Partners were the first hedge fund company in Northern Europe, and have helped into business a string of hedge fund companies through part ownership of the management companies. In the case of Benros, Brummer own a chunk of the equity in return for seed capital of $300m.  

7. Two Sides Of The Performance Race -Bridgewater outperforms (again), and some big name equity managers falter. After producing a return of up 27.4% in 2010 in its Pure Alpha Fund, Bridgewater Associates’ Ray Dalio described that outcome as a one-in-twenty year event. Given that in 2011 over the year to end November HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index was down 4.6%, that probably makes the sequence of +27.4% for 2010 followed by +15.92% for 2011 (to end Nov) for Bridgewater’s flagship fund a once in a century series of events.  While statisticians will claim that given 9,000-plus hedge funds there is bound to be a fund with these good-but-unlikely results – an argument used to negate Warren Buffett’s achievements – realistically one must congratulate Bridgewater Associates for taking advantage of some great market background for their big picture style of investing.  

The same cannot be said for equity long/short managers in general.  The HFRI Equity Hedge Index was down 7.39% for the first 11 months of 2011. Against this benchmark and over the same period the underperformers amongst the larger managers were Kingdon Capital Management (-18.15%) and Lansdowne Partners’ UK Equity Fund (-19.8%). It may not be taken into account fully by investors in equity hedge funds, but in contrast to the opportunity set for Bridgewater, the equity markets were down on the year in 2011 and the see-saw pattern they traced in the second half of the year – no direction but with high volatility – is an adverse market background for most equity long/short managers as they tend to be structurally long biased, and the larger ones have to be biased towards investing rather than trading.

The most noteworthy underperformer of the year amongst the mega managers, the range of funds run by Paulson & Company, has been well covered elsewhere.

The stories that didn’t quite make the list above were on the Shumway Capital Partners restructuring and the rise of seeding capital and seeders in 2011. If you would like to suggest other stories and themes that were characteristic of 2011 please use the comments input field below.

Chart of the Day - Extremely High Correlation of Stocks - Implications for Hedge Funds

I'm doing some work on risk measurement/management at a hedge fund management company. The investment strategy of the hedge fund is long/short equity. Most of the work revolves around measurements at the portfolio level, and the aim of measuring and controlling risk is to produce steady returns for investors. This is only possible on a sustainable basis with a diversified portfolio, unless the hit-rate is unusually high. Whilst  I have met managers with very concentrated portfolios based on very stringent selection criteria, and who have very high career hit-rates (as high as over 90% in one case), most mangers (probably more than the 80:20 rule would suggest) run portfolios diversified by stock, sector and to some extent theme.

Effective risk management is partly about being aware what has a high probability of working and when. One of the lessons of the Credit Crunch for many in hedge fund land is that there are market circumstances in which the previously assumed risk controls will not work. That is, the manager has a series of limits and stops and processes which in combination will produce the desired outcomes for most market conditions. The rub, as revealed in 2008-9, is in the conditional "most". Managers have to be aware of in what market circumstances their approach to markets will not work.

For most equity long/short managers most of the time the key decision variables at the portfolio level are about managing the net exposures to market, and specifically about managing the net beta-adjusted exposure to the market. There is a sub-set of equity managers for whom this is not true - those which have a limit on their net exposure to markets, and are structurally close to net neutral, say a band of 0-20% net long. Often the latter funds are quantitatively-driven equity long/short funds, but some discretionary managers choose to be close to net neutral. For these net-constrained funds returns have to come from stock selection to a much greater extent than funds with wider investment powers. The corollary is often a larger gross exposure to markets - consistent with the formulation of information ratios of managers. Typically, funds with a small net exposure limit target lower absolute returns, and implicitly rank risk-adjusted returns as a higher goal than absolute returns. 

The majority of managers in equity long/short try to use the additional degrees of freedom they have in balance sheet disposition to produce higher absolute returns (than a net-neutral manager) though nearly always with higher volatility of returns. The tactical shape of the fund should be a function of two things: the market regime and the opportunity set for the particular investment style of the manager. There is a considerable range of understanding amongst managers of the necessity of taking these two dimensions into account in setting the net exposure of equity hedge funds. The best managers are good at both, but the majority of equity hedge fund managers are not. Yes, the majority.

The successful shaping of the hedge fund balance sheet requires two attributes in the manager: an ability to read the market regime in multi-dimensions, and a high degree of self knowledge about the applicability (and effectiveness) of their investment processes. Around the time of the Tech Bubble the first required ability was demonstrated a lot by equity hedge fund managers. The monetary stimulus provided by Greenspan on fears of the Millennium bug was read by managers as a bull market condition green light, and most managers were very net long in 1999, and investors were gorged on the excellent returns produced. The reverse happened from March 2000 onwards. By the 3Q 2000 many equity hedge funds were net short on a tactical basis, i.e . the managers jobbed from the short side.  From 2003 to mid 2008 a net long bias and a buy-the-dips mentality were positive attributes for managers. Over the same period many new hedge fund managers joined the industry, and several big names closed down, citing the lack of shorting opportunities as a reason.

So coming into the Credit Crunch phase of 2008 only a minority of equity hedge fund managers expressed an ability to read the market regime by going net neutral or net short. A majority of managers had never been net short to that point, and many did not have that available as a choice because of their offering memoranda, or because the operational limits they gave themselves precluded it.  

Current market conditions have echoes of 2008-9: large daily declines in equity prices, volatility and rising fear gauges in the price of gold and the cost of interbank borrowing. These are difficult conditions in which to manage an equity hedge fund. Quite how difficult is in part reflected in today's chart of the day. Every manager can tell you about the level of market volatility reflected in the Vix Index. This captures the current level of volatility in the market on a traded basis. The actual volatility experienced in the market is lower than the traded level, though intra-day measured volatility can be higher than that indicated by the Vix.

All equity hedge fund managers are aware of how volatility shifts impact their style because they can see it in the daily P&L changes per position, and the same at the portfolio level, and they are aware of the Vix. Those managers who take risk measurement more seriously will be aware of the Value-at-Risk of their portfolios. The same portfolio will have a different measured risk dependent on market conditions - when markets are more volatile measured risk goes up for the same portfolio. What is less well explored is the other element that feeds into the risk measure VaR, that of correlation.

The inter-relatedness of positions has an impact on measured risk. The more related the positions the less diversification there is in a portfolio. Consequently managers structurally build diversification into their portfolios by having limits on sectors/industries/macro-related themes as well as limits to specific stock risk by constraining holding size. But correlation is not stable. Cross-sectional correlation varies through time. In up-trending markets (scenario 1) volatility drops and stocks tend to become less correlated. For sideways moving markets (scenario 2) two stocks in the same sector could quite feasibly act differently - one going up and the other staying the same price, or even falling. Scenario 1 is better for producing returns from net market exposure, and scenario 2 is a richer market opportunity for returns purely from idiosyncratic stock risk (selection).

However when markets fall for a period volatility rises and correlation increases. The correlation coefficients of stocks' betas go up - the market component of stock price changes goes up, and the sector effect increases and the idiosyncratic component of stock price changes declines. The chart of the day below illustrates that we are at an extreme for measured correlation amongst S&P500 constituents.

In such a market environment portfolio returns become a product of the net market exposure, driven by the weighted average of the portfolio betas. The extreme case illustrates the point - bank shares and commodity stocks have had the highest betas in the market for some years now. The return to the net exposure to these two sectors plausibly could have been the largest component of the return of individual equity hedge funds over the last three years. For net neutral equity hedge funds the net exposure decision on these two sectors over the last three years could have even been the decision that determined return outcomes.

For market conditions with high correlation between stocks it is just about impossible to drive returns from stock selection (idiosyncratic risk) alone. This has recently been explicitly recognised by one management team -  Ralph Jainz and Jonathan Sharpe of Ratio Asset Management wrote to their investors on closing their European equity hedge fund this month that "this year stock selection has not proved profitable." History suggests that it is difficult for diversified net neutral funds to make money when there is high correlation between stocks, and only managers who are adept at shaping the balance sheet of their hedge funds will actually make money, as opposed to defending their capital.  

Given that nowadays few managers can demonstrate an ability to read the market regime in multi-dimensions, and have a high degree of self knowledge about the applicability of their investment processes, I expect negative returns from the strategy for the current market. What is particularly disappointing is that the number of managers who can show they truly learned lessons from 2008-9, and can make money now, are so few. Maybe investors have to exhort their managers to take some off some of the net exposure restrictions - or do investors doubt that their managers have sufficient skills to handle wider investment powers?



   

A Shift in Risk Appetite?

I believe in Marshallian K – so excess money creation goes into financial assets if the real economy doesn't need it. This is what is going on now in American financial markets. We are seeing narrow money creation but not broad money growth. The St. Louis Federal Reserve is showing that the current money multiplier is less than 0.9, that is, printed money is not being multiplied by the banks to the typical extent (2.0-3.0).

What is interesting so far in 2011 is the change in where that money is going. In my last article I made a logical case for flows into stocks rather than bonds based on valuation. I doubted that the flows of mutual funds would reflect that logic, but I have been proved wrong by the data releases* of the Investment Company Institute since. Here is a table showing mutual fund flows on two time frames – the top part of the table is monthly data and the bottom part is weekly data for mutual fund flows this year.

U.S. Mutual Fund Flows

Source: Investment Company Institute

The Table shows some interesting shifts. The pattern last year was for positive bond flows and negative equity flows. Whenever equity flows went net positive last year it tended to be because positive flows to emerging market mutual funds outweighed outflows from domestic equity mutual funds. So for three quarters of the year in 2010 there was a large negative bias towards mutual funds investing in American stocks.

Towards the end of the year holders of mutual funds caught on to the increasing fragility of the finances of municipalities in the States and there were net redemptions from muni bond funds. The outflows from muni bond funds have continued this year. There has been a minor pick up in flows into taxable bond funds this year, and it looks like straight switching within bond mutual funds to safer havens. Net flows across total bond funds are a small positive – and really quite small compared to last year's positive net flows. So the key word in the bond mutual fund story in 2011 is small.

The key words in equity mutual funds investing in 2011 to date are growing and domestic. After some minor end year tidying up, the U.S. mutual fund investor has continued to buy overseas equity focused equity mutual funds as before, but the new new thing is the emergence of significant buying of domestic equity mutual funds. The market for mutual funds in the United States is not like in some European territories where the largest investor in a UCITS funds can be the sponsoring insurer or bank. In the United States, apart from money market funds where institutions own around a third of the assets, mutual funds are held by individual investors. Individuals own 89% of bond funds and 91% of equity funds. And the man in the street in the US has been buying domestic equity mutual funds to an extent not seen in at least four years.

Whilst individual investors are recent converts to the attractiveness of equities, institutional investors crossed that line some time ago and at this point are expressing fervour for the concept.  The Merrill Lynch Fund Manager Survey for February (survey period 4th-10th February) contains extreme conviction on the part of institutions. The Survey overview states "The February FMS is one of the most bullish in years. Institutions have record equity and commodity overweights, very low cash levels and the strongest risk appetite since Jan‘06." It also says that "Hedge fund net exposure rose to 39%, highest since July’07. Cash balances fell from 3.7% to 3.5%, triggering our FMS cash trading rule equity sell signal." 

A mirror of the rated attractiveness of equities is an aversion to bonds in the Survey - nominal bond allocations were very low; the lowest since April of 2006 and near record lows. This is the corollary of the view on inflation (and implicitly commodities) that expectations for global inflation were the highest since June of 2004.  There is a consistency of world view too in the consensus for economic growth. Just 13% of respondents expect the global economy to weaken in the next 12 months. 


Parenthetically it is interesting that professional money managers express the same sentiment now that mutual fund flows have expressed this year  - a strong bias towards the equity markets of the developed world rather than emerging market equities. The expressed appetite for U.S. equities is the second highest ever in the Fund Manager Survey. 

The mental positioning, and Dollar positioning, of investors in equity markets combined with expressed survey views on growth and inflation give a clear road map for contrarian investors. For example I would suggest that the views of Hugh Hendry put across here (Hugh Hendry's views) were for something other than where the consensus has got to. Equity markets are overbought, and extended to the upside. However, overbought conditions can persist and there is little internal inconsistency in the market action for a tape reader to find. One of the market observers I respect puts it that the broad market "continues to demonstrate bullish resiliency".

*Flow estimates are derived from data collected covering more than 95 percent of industry assets and are adjusted to represent industry totals in the weekly data. Data for previous weeks reflect revisions due to data adjustments, reclassifications, and changes in the number of funds reporting.

Stocks over Bonds for 2011

Just over a year ago I featured as my Chart of the Day the mutual fund flows for U.S. bond funds and equity funds. At that point I summarised the attitudes of retail investors as "keep me out of Wall Street, I want the return of my cash, and I can only trust Uncle Sam with my money at the moment, thank you." The updated chart (Fig 1 below) shows that 2010 had more of the same, that is, huge inflows to bond funds and net outflows from equity mutual funds.

                                  Fig 1. Monthly Net New Cash Flows to U.S. Mutual Funds by Asset Class

As at the previous point of review (December 2009) the logical case now is very strong for a preference for equities over bonds based on valuation. Looking at the P/E ratio of American shares in isolation the case is not particularly convincing as Figure 2 shows. The S&P 500 trades at 13.6x forward four quarter earnings – this level is neither cheap nor dear in an absolute sense. But the context is very constructive: inflation is low at the consumer level; interest rates, whether real or absolute, are low and will remain so for some time; and earnings growth may be a positive surprise in 2011 as expectations are low.

                                    Fig 2. P/E Ratio of U.S. Stocks based on 12m Forward Estimates

The earnings surprise at the market level could come because expectations are low and the American corporate sector is well set in several regards. First the operating leverage is good after staying lean and mean, and hiring has only recently begun. Secondly the level of the Dollar makes the U.S. internationally competitive (and exports accounted for 1.1 percentage points of the 3.2% increase in real GDP in 2010). Thirdly, and this will be very important this year, unlike the consumer and the government, the corporate sector has a good balance sheet in aggregate. I place an emphasis on the balance sheet because there is good scope for capital spending as well as hiring, and, most importantly for investor psychology, conditions are good for a lot more mergers and acquisition activity this year.

However, even if the earnings growth for 2011 only turns out to be in line with the current consensus, a strong case can be made for a preference for stocks over bonds on the basis of relative valuation. This is illustrated in Figure 3.

                                                      Fig 3. Yield Comparison for Stocks v Bonds 
                                               (Earnings Yield on S&P500 v Real Yield on 10 Year Treasuries)

The widening gap between the real yield on the highest quality bonds and the earnings yield on American blue-chip stocks (the inversion of the P/E ratio) reflects the neglect by investors of stocks relative to bonds. The risk premium for stocks now is higher than it has been for more than 80% of the last decade, and at nearly 3.9% is 1.6% higher than the average over the last 10 years. The logical case is very strong - on the basis of valuation investors should switch out of bonds and into stocks.

On the basis of investor psychology investors won't switch. The aversion of the man in the street to anything to do with Wall Street will continue. ETFs have continued to grow whilst equity mutual funds remain out of favour suggesting that Americans don't want to give money to stock-selecting money managers. Individual investors are dis-engaged with markets to an extent rarely seen before. In short, America has fallen out of love with stocks.

Another Year Another Challenge for Funds of Funds

In 2008 the fund of funds industry had a tough time producing returns for investors because only 30% of hedge funds produced a positive return. For 2009 things were tough for funds of funds as they couldn't get out of the hedge funds that had let them down by making losses in 2008, because of limited liquidity in the funds, suspended redemptions, and sidecars. Further, few of the funds which made money in 2008 made good money in 2009. So if funds of hedge funds stayed loyal to their winners of 2008 it probably cost them in 2009. There was even a reversal of the size effect on hedge fund returns in moving from 2008 to 2009. 

Before looking at hedge fund returns in 2010, and factors that will impact fund of funds returns, let's look at single manager hedge fund returns in 2008 and 2009 from an absolute and relative perspective.

2008 was an absolute disappointment in terms of hedge fund returns- a loss of around 16%. Last year hedge funds produced their best returns since 1997, at up 19%, by the Greenwich Global Hedge Fund Index. And year to date through July, the same hedge fund index has a small positive return (up 1%), which is not good in isolation as an absolute return over seven months. 

The returns from equities put the absolute returns of hedge funds into some context. Using the S&P500 as a proxy for the equity asset class, the hedge fund returns of 2008-9 look very different. The S&P500 was down 38.5% in 2008, the year hedge funds at an index level lost 16% in a liquidity crisis with high volatility and fraud in the industry, and even so 30% of hedge funds were up.

In 2009 the S&P500 was up 23.5% and hedge funds were up 19%, which given the constrained directionality (beta to markets) is as good as it gets for the alternative funds. Over 70% of hedge funds produced positive returns in 2009.  

This year the S&P is down 4.3% at the time of writing, whilst representative indices of hedge funds are up a small amount.  However the context for hedge fund returns in 2010 is even tougher in some regards than the previous two years. To begin with, let's look at the trajectory of the equity market this year. Below is a one year chart of the S&P500.

source:stockcharts.com

The rally of the second half of 2009 actually peaked in the first few weeks of 2010, and thereafter the stock market has been a rollercoaster of epic proportions, meaning a serious of precipitous falls followed by sharp rises. Monthly index level changes of 7-8% have not been unusual since the outbreak of the Credit Crunch, but the sequences have changed: we had a string of big down months in the bear market to the low in March last year, then a series of big up moves in the massive rally of the last three quarters of last year. In 2010 we have had big up and big down moves alternately. Given that managing the net exposure is typically the biggest risk control variable of most hedge fund strategies (bar the market neutral strategies), this year has been amongst the most difficult market direction background I can recall, as the market was aggressively moving one way and then the other by turns.

Persistence of market movement, or propensity to trend, is different from volatility in traded markets. It turns out that the actual volatility of the S&P500 index, as a proxy for global equity markets, has been both unusually low and then high  this year. The chart below shows 30-day historic or actual volatility of the S&P500.

source: Bloomberg LLP

A level above 25% historic volatility (as opposed to traded volatility) has been uncommon in equity markets, except for short periods, and except for the last two years. The shifts in volatility seen this year would probably have hurt more hedge fund strategies than they helped. Pure volatility strategies should have benefited from the April/May shift in volatility, and the delta hedging of CB arbitrage funds should have had a good background in March and after the June peak in volatility . Overall 51% of hedge funds by number had produced positive absolute returns at the half way point of the year. This hurdle was exceeded by 68% of hedge funds at the end of the first quarter of the year, so the year has got progressively tougher as it has gone on - that falling success rate persisted into the end of August

Hedge Fund Returns by Strategy

source:Greenwich Alternative Investments

Returns by strategy are for the most part marginally profitable or loss making this year. As this is the case, differences in index and sub-index construction and scope have produced different outcomes. What one index provider has as a strategy with a positive return, another shows a negative return for.  Lipper's series of hedge fund strategy indices has only two strategies out of 13 given producing positive returns this year.  Greenwich Global Hedge Fund Indices show only three strategies with negative returns in the YTD (out of a total of 15). Both index providers agree that Long/Short Credit and Convertble Bond Arbitrage are amongst the best strategies for returns so far this year.

Looking across other index providers (Dow Jones Credit Suisse, and Hedgefund.net) it looks as if a small majority of hedge fund indices for strategies produced positive returns in the first seven months of the year. This hit-rate for positive returns by strategy in combination with the dispersion of returns within the strategy has some interesting implications. 

Dispersion of Hedge Fund Returns Within Strategies January-July 2010

source: Lipper, a Thomson Reuters company, TASS database

The dispersion of returns within the investment strategy categories of hedge funds is lower this year than last year. However this year the dispersion ranges for each strategy includes a significantly proportion of negative returns. This is a very different outcome from 2009, when the spread of returns by strategy may have been wider than this year, but returns were overwhelmingly positive. 

The read through to funds of hedge funds will be interesting. Another way of looking at the last two calendar years is that positive returns came from CTA and global macro in 2008, and those two strategies significantly lagged the other hedge fund strategies in 2009. So there were significant returns to active strategy allocation/weightings for investors in hedge funds in both years, though the positively contributing strategies were not consistent through time.

This year, given the dispersion of hedge fund returns within strategies, and with a fair amount of funds with losses as well as funds with profits within each strategy, fund of funds relative returns will be impacted much more by manager selection within each strategy silo than we have seen for a while. Strategy allocation will still have a part to play, but the 2010 ranking of returns from funds of funds will be about old style returns - driven from the bottom up.     

Of course all funds of funds claim that manager selection is a key skill. It will be interesting to see if those managers that make a special play of their abilities at manager selection in their client presentations come through with top ranking returns in 2010.

One Step Beyond for Lipper on Hedge Funds

We are well used to output from Thomson Reuters reporting on factual stories on the hedge fund industry. Through the Lipper subsidiary they are going a step further. Up to this point Global Head of Hedge Fund Research Aureliano Gentilini has published research looking backwards. He has gone from exhaustive analysis on dispersions of hedge fund returns and returns by strategy to something altogether less certain – forecasting.

What he has produced is the kind of output you see from funds of funds managers as they describe the macro environment and how it may suit/hurt the returns from the various hedge fund strategies.

Here are some edited extracts from Lipper Hedge Funds Insight Report, “Hedge Funds Outlook”, May 2010

Selected hedge fund strategies are expected to successfully navigate current market turmoil as the risk/return profile of hedge fund managers remains intact

􀁠 The global macro-scenario, macro-information flow arrival, and volatility clustering are expected to continue dominating market sentiment in the short run.

􀁠 In the current trading environment macro and systematic traders are expected to benefit the most from trading across diverse asset classes.

􀁠 Looking at the recent past, historical patterns occurring in 2007 might materialize again. Several macro-driven "crowded trades" are about to appear again in hedge portfolios.

􀁠 Concerns about absorption of new government bond issuance of PIIGS countries and low bid-to-cover ratios at government debt auctions will affect the intermediate-to-long sector of the yield curve in those countries.

􀁠 The Dedicated Short-Bias strategy will be a bright spot as market fears resume. The ten-day exponential moving average of the CBOE Equity Put/Call Ratio—a gauge of the sentiment of speculative traders, which hit a multi-year record low of 0.472 on April 15—appears to be close to a reversal to the downside.

􀁠 FX strategies will continue offering attractive opportunities to lock in profits in the short term. Of interest is the change in positioning that large speculators executed in the euro foreign exchange futures markets in the week ending May 18.

􀁠 In the current market scenario gold and the U.S. dollar are expected to again trend higher in tandem, with the precious metal trending to record highs after a temporary pause.

Rate of Inflows to Hedge Fund Industry Fail to Accelerate in 2010

TrimTabs Investment Research and BarclayHedge reported that the hedge fund industry posted an estimated inflow of $7.6 billion, or 0.5% of assets, in March 2010.  The firms estimate that hedge fund assets stand at a 16-month high of $1.64 trillion. Hedge fund third-party marketers have not seen much of these flows - they say that they have seen subscriptions static or even slightly lower than at the end of last year.

It could be that these statements are not incompatible: much of the net inflows to date have been to large well-established funds who do not feel the need to use 3PMs. The external marketers will see their share of flows when the scale of flows pick up further, and when industry flows broaden out across the strategies, and broaden across the maturity and scale range seen in the industry.

In terms of strategies in receipt of these flows the trends of last year have continued: Event Driven funds have done best, having had an inflow in March equivalent to 1.5% of assets, on the back of industry leading returns of 6.6% in the first four months of the year. The largest outflows from an investment strategy in March 2010 were from the Multi-Strategy Funds – a strategy that had net outflows through last year.

 
Industry Level Net Flows Per Month

Inflows in November 2009     $18.7bn

Inflows in December 2009      -$3.8bn

Inflows in January 2010           $7.1bn

Inflows in February 2010        $16.6bn

Inflows in March 2010             $7.6bn

Source: TrimTabs Investment Research and BarclayHedge


 
The flows at the industry level are unlikely to pick up in the next few months given the gyrations in the markets for traditional assets. Collective memory of falling markets is still strong at this point, only just over a year on from the market lows. The level of traded equity volatility has doubled in the last few weeks, and price levels in FX, commodities, equities and bonds have shifted quickly enough that the perceptions are that the markets are trading more emotionally. This is not the background against which most institutional investors can devote senior management time to making active decisions about allocations to hedge fund strategies, and still less about allocations to individual hedge fund managers.

Clarium Redux - Still Arguing with Markets, Still Losing

I am grateful to the website market folly (www.marketfolly.com) for this input on Clarium Capital, the global macro fund manager.

Peter Thiel, source:Bloomberg

" Even more shocking perhaps is that the downward spiral at Peter Thiel's hedge fund Clarium Capital has continued. ZeroHedge noted that Clarium lost 6.1% in the first three weeks of March and was now down 5.4% for the year. This all comes as US equity markets are up over 6.4% for 2010. We're not quite sure what's going on over there but after a fantastic start to the fund, the last few years have been quite rough on them, to put it politely. They were down 25% in 2009 according to our hedge fund performance numbers post. However, as of the recent performance data, they were still up 210% since inception.

Returns from Special Situations to Become Special Again?

A few months ago I was a guest on the hedge fund radio show "The Naked Short Club" on Resonance FM. A question for the panel was "which hedge fund strategies did we each prefer this year?" My choice then and now are the event-driven strategies. I chose those strategies partly because the evidence of surveys of investors have not mentioned event-driven as a favourite (except for distressed), and on the basis of the market environment I see unfolding this year. Distressed securities funds posted the biggest inflow as a percentage of AUM in February this year (at 4.2% of assets) according to TrimTabs Investment Research and BarclayHedge - so they are hardly being ignored.

It still remains the case that investors compiling survey responses cite what has done well for the last six months, but what has changed over a shorter time-frame is the outlook for the special situations component of the event driven set of strategies. At the turn of the year it was somewhat fanciful to suggest that the market environment would be suitable for special sits investors - up to that point corporate activity was very limited in publicly traded markets. From a UK perspective we had a clear landmark takeover in the acquisition of Cadbury's by Kraft Inc, but other forms of M&A activity have taken place and there is activity in sectors beyond those that are consumer-related. The stock markets have reached recovery highs, retracing all of the fall from the second week of January into mid February. This has revived the animal spirits that drive markets, and primary and secondary issuance has picked up and will increase from here. 

IPOs  Spin-outs and Buy-ins as well as Takeovers

The issuance will be for a range of purposes- IPOs, spin-outs, and buy-ins as well as takeovers. IPOs that were scheduled to take place in February and were postponed will now be back under active consideration. The recovery in valuations in markets will encourage managements to listen to the sum-of-the-parts arguments and enhance shareholder value through spin-outs like that of Enquest from Petrofac. Just last week there was an example of a buy-in, as Agnico-Eagle Mines stepped up to the plate and elected to offer to acquire all the shares it does not already own in Comaplex Minerals.

M&A is back in the revived energy sector, and will come back in other resource-based sectors. The Chinese have stated their desire to acquire strategic resources on a global basis, and their activities will spark the attention of other acquirers on a game theory basis. In upstream energy in 2009 alone, China spent $16 billion gaining footprints in Canadian oil sands, the Gulf of Mexico, Nigeria, Gabon, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia and Kazakhstan. There are expected to be more National Oil Company acquisitions this year in unconventional oil and gas production primarily sourced from gas shales, tight gas sands and oil sands according to industry consultants. Energy M&A will not be confined to NOCs and producing assets as shown by the acquisition of Smith International by Schlumberger.
In mining the secondary and tertiary stocks amongst the miners and mineral exploration stocks have started to out-perform the global major mining stocks as interest warms up. Before Easter there was corporate activity in gold (Newcrest's proposal to merge with Lihir Gold) and in the coal sector, and further deals in zinc. 

Not Just Resources

However, deal flow will not be confined to resources industries, as value is apparent elsewhere to corporate buyers. Hedge fund manager Leon Cooperman of Omega Advisors has been interviewed in Fortune magazine recently. Asked about increased takeover activity he said that it reflects the fact that the stock market is selling about in line with replacement costs. "With the credit markets improving and business getting a little better, corporations are showing a willingness to buy other businesses, and they are paying up for them," he noted*.

He continued, "We have seen a large number of deals where the average premium over the market price has been approximately 40%. When Air Products (APD, Fortune 500) bids $5 billion in cash for AirGas (ARG), which is 38% over market price, Air Products is telling us they feel sufficiently comfortable about their own business that they are willing to take on a lot of debt to do the deal. It's the same thing with Merck AG's $7 billion offer to buy Millipore (MIL) and Simon Property's (SPG) $10 billion bid to acquire General Growth Properties (GGP). When you buy a share in a business, you're buying a share of its brick, mortar, machinery, and earning power. What corporations are saying is that the equity market is not overvalued."

The corporate buyer has not been absent from the market, but should be more evident in the rest of this year. The pressures resulting from the "shareholder value" mantra is still there, and the continuing recovery of the banking sector will allow some debt financing this year, which was largely absent last year. For similar reasons it would not come as a surprise to see more activity by private equity in the second half of the year, both disposals and acquisitions. This combination of factors will present an increasingly rich environment for managers of special situations capital, both on a dedicated basis and as part of a multi-strategy offering. Better returns will result for special sits strategies.

  *The article won't link directly but can be found at http://money.cnn.com/, using search term "Leon Cooperman"

Performance of Equity Hedge Funds versus Equity Markets This Year

Investors don't need investments in equity hedge funds on a multi-month basis when equity markets are in a multi-year bull market. At the margin equity hedge fund holdings would moderate a monthly return series of pure fully-invested equity market exposures. In prolonged bull phases equity hedge holdings would produce slightly lower losses in the down months, during the pauses that refresh in major bull markets. But equity hedge fund exposure will not produce positive absolute returns in down months of a prolonged bull. This is shown in the first graphic below.

The first graphic (courtesy of Bloomberg LLP) shows the price series and relative returns of HFR's Investible Equity Hedge Index and the S&P500. HFRXEH is a good proxy of US-based equity hedge managers, and has the distinct advantage for hedge fund watchers of being a daily return series. The top half of the graphic shows two line charts for the two indices. The green shaded part of the lower half of the first graphic shows the relative performance of equity hedge funds against the equity market. When the line in the lower half moves up equity hedge funds are out-performing equity markets, and vice versa.

So the lower half of the first graphic shows that equity hedge funds under-perfromed the multi-year equity bull market of 2003 to August 2007, then out-performed the equity market into the market low of March 2009.

The second graphic here tells the same story over the last 17 months. Simply put, equity hedge fund managers as a whole cannot match a market rally of 50%-plus from the low that turns on a dime.

Amongst the questions I want to address here is how have equity hedge funds done this year, and what should investors in equity hedge funds have expected, given the market conditions experienced.

Over the year-to-date (up to and including Monday the 8th of February) the HFR Equity Hedge Index has fallen 1.6%, and over that time the S&P has fallen 5.2%.  There have been two distinct phases for the equity market in the year to date period: stocks rallied 3.1% from the start of the year to the S&P high on the 19th of January, and then stocks fell 8.1% to the 8th of January. The high for the HFR hedge fund index came a week before the price peak of the S&P500: the inference being that equity hedge managers were already reigning back net equity market exposure as the market approached its peak. Further, the relative movements of the hedge fund index to the stock market index sugggest that in the first two weeks of the year equity hedge fund managers as an aggregate had a net market exposure of around 80%. From the stock market peak on the 19th of January to the 8th of February the decline in equity hedge fund NAVs suggests that the net exposure of equity hedge funds in America was just under 60%.

The returns from equity hedge funds this year will have come from both stock selection and net market beta, and at the index level it is not possible to break that down (ask your manager for details). The evidence from the year to date numbers so far is that equity hedge managers have reduced their net exposures going into the fall in stock prices and mitigated the losses of the capital of their investors through so doing.


Addendum: The BoA/Merrill Lynch Hedge Fund Monitor for 8th February estimated that (globally) equity long/short funds had cut market exposure to a net 27-28%  in the first week of February. If so that would be the lowest net exposure to markets since May of 2009.

Chart of the Week – Bond Mutual Fund Flows

I often write about the US stock market for a number of reasons. I have been a professional investor investing in that market. The US market is the largest and most developed in the world. The US stock market usually sets the tone and the pace for other markets – correlations are very high between other equity markets and the US equity market. The expression "if New York sneezes London catches a cold" is a truism that could be applied to most markets. Since the globalisation of US portfolio flows first by Capital International and Fidelity and then by US hedge funds the sectoral out and under -performance within stock markets have become global phenomena. Plus the ready availability of data and a long history of data collection and analysis allow investors to use tools based on American market phenomena that should work elsewhere, but if not the market-level call will still prevail. So looking at and analysing the American stockmarket is looking at the world of equities on a week-to-week or month-to-month basis.

I often have a "fact of the week" and "chart of the week". This week's chart is below and comes courtesy of Citigroup's research. It shows US mutual fund flows over the last five years.

This year the stock market has been about bear psychology in the first quarter, and since then about liquidity. I believe in Marshallian K, so to me the rally was mostly explicable by the enormous money creation and liquidity creation we saw in the last 18 months being channelled into financial assets because the real economy could only use it up with a lag. The US economy has started to grow, so towards the end of the year the rate of gain in stocks tailed off, as the real economy started to use the money that was created a year ago.

So having a rally in 2009 was not a surprise. The scale of the rally did surprise me but should not have done – the historical precedent of the Great Crash had an analogous rally – also a 50% retracement, and up around 50% from the low. One of the reasons that I thought that the rally might be significantly smaller was the psychology of investors. The Coppock indicator is based on recovery from trauma. In my mind the Coppock indicator is of limited use. Indeed it is only useful for non-professional investors – it is lagging and confirms only buy signals, but does tell long-term investors that a market is safe. The Coppock indicator is based on 11 and 14 month moving averages. I has assumed that we would have a limited recovery because it just takes longer than a few months to get over the trauma of what happened in the 2H of 2008. It turned out that the balancing item of liquidity provision was so huge that it overwhelmed the psychological imperative in 2009.

I think the chart of US mutual fund flows from the Investment Company Institute tells us a lot about the state of psychology of the US individual investor, and to some extent about the psychology of all investors in equities. We are still very much in the mode of "it is the return of my money that is important rather than the return on my money". I first heard the expression that "cash was trash" in the early '90s. At that point a bull market was still in gear, the bail-out of S&L s had taken place and returns on cash were derisory by the standard of recent decades. There was a compulsion to put money into stocks and other financial assets because there was nowhere else to go. The events of 2008, and the money market fund scandals, and the level of trust in banks all reinforce staying out of money market funds and other cash proxies to a degree. Sales of domestic equity mutual funds have been minimal this year. The positive flows to equities such as they were went into overseas equity mutual funds, as if Main Street didn't want to give its money to Wall Street. Almost by default US mutual fund investors have moved out on the steep yield curve and bought bond funds. Over the last 18 months more money has been put into bond funds than was taken out of US equity mutual funds.

So the current state of psychology of US investors is keep me out of Wall Street, I want the return of my cash, and I can only trust Uncle Sam with my money at the moment, thank you.

The equity market low was mid-March 2009. Eleven months on from there is February 2010. If the trauma of the Credit Crunch of 2008 is mitigated in the period around March-to-May 2010, where will US and other investors put their capital then? Cash will still be trash: even if the Fed raise rates it won't be by much. So a big question for next year, maybe even THE big question for next year is whither inflation, government borrowings and bond yields?


POSTSCRIPT
Two prominent hedge fund managers are making big bets on U.S. Treasury yields.

John Paulson’s Paulson & Co. has begun shorting U.S. government bonds, believing that inflation will lead to higher yields, which will drive down the price of the securities, the Financial Times reports. “It will be difficult for the government to withdraw the economic stimulus,” Paulson said in a recent speech. “An increase in the monetary base leads to an increase in the money supply, which leads to inflation.” According to the FT, another major hedge fund, TPG-Axon Capital Management, is also betting on rising yields.