Translations of a Due Diligence Meeting for a Hedge Fund

A well prepared due diligence meeting has a subtext. The following translations will help hedge fund managers understand from where their interrogators (and potential investors) are coming.

Do you have any plans to add any employees? (Do you plan to re-model your house in the near future or are you going to back the growth of your own business?)

How concentrated is the list of your current investors? (We know if GAM pull you are you f****d)

 

I see you use an external compliance consultant. (I see you think that a small retainer to former FSA staffer can replace a core internal activity of an asset management business)

Is there a particular reason for the risk manager to be located in the annex? (We have spotted how frivolously you treat risk management that is not in your head)

Can you talk me through how you coped with October and November 2008? (What wholesale changes have you made to your risk controls to make sure that disaster zone of a return doesn’t happen again?)

Can I talk to your head of operations about that? (You clearly know nothing about what the back office does)

What was the background for your former partner to leave last year? (Who had the biggest ego between the two founders?)

Who bought the pictures in this meeting room? (Whose taste is THIS?)

These are nice offices and a great location. (This is a big overhead for a small business)

What a friendly dog!  (Having the principal’s name over the door was not just the default choice)

What is your experience of using this system for operations? (I’ve never heard of this supplier)

Can I deal with you directly from here on? (This third part marketer is a piece-of-work)

Hedge Fund Returns Are Path Dependent - As 2011 Illustrates

One of the things that is attempted on this website is to look at market action to help explain, or comprehend hedge fund returns. For example, two years ago a commentary was distributed on the significance of the quality factor in explaining returns in 2009 (see this article), and the impact of high correlation this year was explored  (here) too. This year has been a very unusual year in the macro background and in how markets have moved - year three of a recovery does not normally look like this one in economics or markets. 

The market events of this year have been a slalom course for hedge fund managers to negotiate (risk on/risk off), and the hedge fund indices reflect that. The HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index was down 8.58% for the year up to Monday (the 5th of December), and directional funds have fared a lot worse than non-directional strategies (the former are down 18% on an index basis).

Manager letters can be a good source of market context for hedge fund returns. In particular managers taking a quantitative approach are risk aware by nature and typically have a numerically stronger way of expressing the market conditions, and the suitability of their own methodology for extracting value from them.The overview reproduced below comes from Quant Asset Management of Singapore, managers of a portfolio of global equities.

Dear Investor,

It is unusual for us to add any written text to our monthly email other than the standard text in the newsletter. Since we apply a consistent, systematic investment methodology, once familiar with the methodology, the newsletter is normally self-explanatory. But because we are currently witnessing the biggest draw-down since the inception of the QAM Global Equities fund, 71/2 years ago, we’d like to use this opportunity to share some of our thoughts on this.

We now had a period of seven consecutive negative months with the fund being down 22% for the year. The main reasons for the negative performance are:

1) We use mostly fundamental factors when selecting our stocks from a global universe of over 6000 stocks. Fundamentals haven’t been driving markets in the past seven months. Macro-economic factors were driving markets and correlations have been at an all time high.

2) We use a trend following methodology that adjust factor weightings each period for what worked well in a certain past period (dynamic) before. This didn’t work well in the past seven months due to volatility spikes and trend reversals.

3) We use a hedging methodology whereby we are either 0% or 50% net exposed mostly based on aggregate earnings revisions number and some price performance related techniques. This hasn’t added value in the past seven months.

So the question arises if our methodology is still valid and when will it work again?          

First of all; all good investment methodologies go through periods where they struggle but as long as they add value over time and make logical sense, it makes sense to stick with them in order to achieve above average returns.

Furthermore we believe that systematically picking a large number of stocks on the basis of fundamentals (valuations, earnings growth and earnings revisions) combined with a factor adaption methodology, whilst hedging out a large part of the market risk, does add lots of value. Remember that the fund is up 154% since inception. This compares to 16% for the MSCI World in the same period.

We have always allowed volatility in our funds (around 20%, which is much more than most of our peers) in order to achieve higher returns than our peers. These high returns have been achieved and we have a strong belief that they can be achieved again. In order for this to happen one has to allow certain periods of under-performance. Draw downs are pretty natural and frequent in fundamental factor adaptation systems and one should be reminded that they can create opportunities too.

Kind regards,
The QAM Team

The letter is reproduced here to give some insight to market drivers of return this year, not to point fingers at a style or a particular manager. The general point is that the vast majority of managers take a specific approach to markets that they hope works most of the time and for most market conditions. The marketing conceit of an "all weather" hedge fund or strategy died in 2008. The returns delivered by a manager are a function of their own style and the opportunity set available from the market over the period. It is very striking  that the gyrations of markets in 2010 and 2011 made it very difficult for equity hedge fund managers to make positive absolute returns except when the equity market letter was written by the Fed and other central banks through the mechanism of QE2 (from August 2010 to March 2011). 

Hedge fund returns are path dependent, not independent of the direction of markets, nor independent of changes to intra-market or inter-market correlation, nor unaffected by the extent to which markets trend. The specific sequence of ups and downs, step-wise shifts in volatility, and how long a market regime lasts impacts the ability of the manager to harvest alpha in the way they are set up to address markets. So, for example, it would not just be relevant that markets were down 5% over a six month period, but in understanding outcomes it is more relevant that they appreciated by 11% over six weeks before losing 15-16% over 4 months (with specific volatility and correlation conditions). 

It is up to the investor in hedge funds to put together portfolios of funds which take account of the various market conditions which may occur, in full knowledge of the manager style. Building such an efficient portfolio of funds can only be achieved when investors truly understand how their capital is being applied to markets by their managers. Provided the managers stick to their expressed style, there should be a limited number of surprises to investors in hedge funds given market conditions, and how market conditions change (the specific path markets follow). For any given market conditions and sequences the better investors in hedge funds will have a range of expected return per manager in which they are invested. As yet, the path dependency of hedge fund returns is not sufficiently well appreciated  - spread the word.



UCITS III Footnote - the offshore fund from QAM was down 23.49% over the period end Feb 2011 to the end of November. The onshore equivalent  - Quant Global Equities fund, a sub-fund of the Quant AM SICAV (a UCITS III type fund) - was down  27.77% over the same period. The onshore version launched in March this year.

The Dangers of Mixing the Functions in a Hedge Fund Management Company

In an in-depth due diligence questionnaire of a hedge fund manager there is often a question about the outside business interests of the principals. For an organisation with a broad team of decision makers managing investments this is less of a concern. To the extent that there is a single presiding talent who sets the tone and manages the largest allocation of capital, it is an issue if an individual has executive duties in other companies, or has too many non-executive directorships or Board positions. Think of SAC - if Steve Cohen more actively pursued his art interests at the expense of time at the firm would that that impact the returns produced by the whole firm? Undoubtedly, yes. But there are other ways in which hedge fund investment managers can be distracted from their main event.

I was reading about companies' management structure (link here, with thanks to author Daniel Dupree), perhaps a hangover from my Business Studies degree, and  was reflecting on how the construct applied to the hedge fund business. The article was about levels of management:

Management levels within an organization exist to demarcate different roles within the organization or company, and to help establish a chain of command. Broadly, there are three main levels of management. You can think of the levels as a triangle, or pyramid. At the top level, there are fewer people, but they have more say in the overall direction of the company — they have more authority. This level is often called the administrative level. At the second level of management, you have those who have some authority over certain departments or projects. This is called the executory level, since those who populate it are involved in executing so that the aims of the organization are met. Finally, at the bottom of the pyramid, is the supervisory level. These are managers that have more direct contact with workers, and are mainly involved in encouraging performance, and monitoring employees. 

The article then goes on to describe the scope of work in each level. Here are the descriptions of the top two levels:

Top Level: Administrative

The top level of management in most organizations is the ultimate authority. Administrative level managers can give authority to other managers in the organization, delegating to, or directly promoting, other managers. The top level of management consists of board of directors, top officers in the company, and directors in the company. Some of the functions of those at the top level of management include:

• Setting out the goals, benchmarks and big picture for the organization.
• Prepares policies for the organization, and sets forth consequences for their violation.
• Promotes and appoints others to fulfill various roles in the company.
• Coordinates activities for the whole organization, making sure that different departments are working in tandem to reach the organization’s goals.
• Usually in charge of making public statements on behalf of the organization, as well as making appearances so that the community is aware of what the company is doing.
• Directs broad changes in company direction.
• Shows accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders in the company.
• Ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the organization and its enterprises.

Those in the top level of management are often well-compensated for their efforts, due to the fact that, in theory, they have great responsibilities. It can be difficult to make it to the top level of management, since those positions are often scarce, and the competition for them is fierce. However, with hard work, good ideas, competence, and an ability to network, it is possible to reach the top level of management.

 

Middle Level: Executory

Depending on the size of the company or organization, middle management can be bigger or smaller. In some of the smaller organizations, the functions of the middle level and lower level of management are combined. However, in larger organizations, middle level management often requires additional divisions into senior and junior levels.

At this level, managers are in charge of branches or departments. Their job is to come up with sub-plans that contribute to the success of the company when meeting its goals. Middle managers are often involved in making sure that the steps to achieving the larger aims of the company are carried out. Some of the other duties that those at the executory level of management might be required to carry out include:

• Training lower management, and training employees.
• Coming up with incentives for employees and lower level managers.
• Coordinating projects within the departments and branches.
• Evaluating employee and lower manager performance.
• At more senior positions in middle management, sometimes it is necessary to interact with the public, or issue statements.
• Report to members of the top level of management. This might include in-person reports, or written reports and memos.
• Enforce policies handed down from top management, and sometimes discipline lower level managers, or employees.

The owners of hedge fund businesses carry out all the tasks of Top Level Management as given above. However, it is quite usual for the largest shareholders of a hedge fund business to be carrying out the main activity of the company, that of carrying out research and making investment decisions. That is, the principals of a hedge fund management company carry out the Executory Level activity as well as fulfill the roles of those in the Administrative Level. Even where there is a separate CEO in a hedge fund, the CIO whose name is over the door is highly likely to be involved in decision-making related to how the business is run as well as how the investments are run.

Switching Modes

For many senior figures running portfolios this involves looking at a trading screen and taking company and investor meetings until the end of the trading day, and then switching modes to take Executive Committee meetings and Board Meetings into the early evening. If there are not those formal meetings there will be job interviews and looking through (management information system) reports on the business after the Bloomberg screen has gone dark.

I had a reminder of the duality of the lives of the senior executives running hedge fund companies when I bumped into one of them off Davies Street in Mayfair yesterday. In the course of  our exchange he disclosed that the meetings and reading of documents associated with the expansion of his business was taking up some of his normal trading screen time. He said "I've cut back on the number of markets I'm actively tracking, and, to be honest, even in those I'm relying on what I researched earlier this year for the core of my views."

This chimed with what I had read about events at Touradji Capital Management this year. Paul Touradji is the former head of commodities trading at Tiger Management who set up his own firm in 2005. Just over two years later Touradji Capital was running $3.5bn in commodity related funds. But the progress of the firm has not been smooth since the Credit Crunch.

Returns from the funds were disappointing in the last two calendar years - up 4.5% in 2009 and then up 2% in 2010 against a background of bull market conditions in commodities. Investor redemptions took capital down to below $2bn this year. The senior management team has not been stable. Gil Caffrey came on board from FrontPoint Partners to be CEO at Touradji Capital Management, only to decide last year to walk across the hall back to Tiger Management. Julian Robertson's Tiger Management shares office space with Touradji Capital on Park Avenue, New York. Sang Lee was brought in as President of Touradji Capital in October 2010 as part of a handover of day-to-day management of the firm from Caffrey. But that transition was not successful.

It was announced last month that President and Chief Operating Officer Sang Lee and CFO Tom Dwan will leave the firm, and a search is on for high calibre replacements. In a letter to his investors Paul Touradji wrote "Simply put, the daily operation of the firm must go from being a major time and energy drain on me to an integral support function for our entire team, allowing us to concentrate our full attention on investment performance." The flagship fund of Touradji Capital Management was down 17% in the first 8 months of the year.

Touradji Capital Management is not a start up or a very small hedge fund management company. But events there illustrate that non-investment issues can be a drain on the capabilities of professional investment staff at the very top level of hedge fund companies. Even very capable people have to be careful about how they allocated their time and intellectual bandwidth. To consume the creative thinking time of a well-paid investment professional at the top of his game with the banalities of failed trades and who is doing the cash reconciliations this week is a failure of management resource and structure.

Potential investors in hedge funds sometimes go to great lengths in due diligence to fully appreciate the state of play at a hedge fund management company. I heard a comment this week that there is something of an arms race in due diligence processes amongst funds of hedge fund companies, as they try to differentiate themselves on something other than results. But there is a risk in a small company that the scarce resource of management time can move from the mission critical (investing) to the necessary (operations and company oversight) and that is something of which a prudent investor should be aware.

Truly Knowing the Family Office Client is Hedge Fund Marketers' Most Important Challenge Now

Family offices are viewed as having a series of advantages as investors in hedge funds:

1. Family offices tend to have long-term investment horizons.
   
2. They tend to want to live with decisions for some time – as a source of "sticky money" they won't flip a multi-year investment proposition after a couple of bad quarters.
   
3. The investment decision making is often quicker than either funds of hedge funds or institutional investors that use consultants to select hedge funds.
   
4. Due diligence of family offices is less invasive and time consuming than for investing institutions.
   
5. They typically require less client servicing resource than other investors in hedge funds.
   
6. They tend to have less restricted selection criteria than institution al investors – family offices can invest in niche strategies, emerging managers and small funds.

 
Rothstein Kass, the US based professional services firm, last month produced some timely research from talking to 67 family offices in the United States and 84 from outside the U.S. The research indicates that roughly 85% of single-family offices currently invest in hedge funds, and nearly half invest in private equity vehicles. Of those family offices that have existing hedge fund investments (and only they were invited to participate in the survey) nearly 90% of them (88.7%) considered themselves highly likely to add to their investments in hedge funds. Whilst there was no timeframe qualification posed in the question, this means that family offices are probably the most likely group to increase hedge fund commitments of all hedge fund investor types (HNWIs, endowments, pension schemes, insurance companies and charities).


The willingness to commit further capital to hedge funds would put family offices as the investor type with the highest proportional commitment to hedge funds of all. Each year The Institute for Private Investors surveys its 1100 ultra high net worth members to ascertain performance obtained and attitudes to and exposure to the various investment strategies and asset classes. The Family Performance Survey of 2010 (published by Campden Media) gives the average asset allocation across all family offices in this predominantly (89%) American population. As at the end of December 2010 the average exposure to hedge funds and funds of funds of the respondents was 19% of the total assets. This level was similar to that reflected in the 2009 survey, but remains at the top of the range of exposure compared to pension plans, insurers and some endowments. So family offices are already well committed to hedge funds, and have more exposure than others, even before they make further commitments.

 
Over the years studying family offices, Rothstein Kass has developed a number of different segmentation criteria. One very powerful segmentation model is based on psychographics and distinguishes between family offices that are Wealth Creators and those that are Wealth Preservers. Wealth Creators are charged with enhancing or increasing the fortunes of the underlying family. In contrast, Wealth Preservers are focused on ensuring the safeguarding of the underlying family's wealth. In this study the greater majority of the single-family offices can be classified as Wealth Creators, as shown in Graphic 1. The identification of the correct segment for the family office should be very significant for those marketing hedge funds as it feeds into general risk appetite for hedge funds and into the appetite for specific hedge fund investment strategies (Table 1).


Graphic 1. Wealth Creators (70.9%) versus Wealth Preservers (29.1%) amongst Family Offices
 

Source: Rothstein Kass, where N=151 Single-Family Offices


This is how Cheryl B. Rogers, Senior Vice President at Forbes Private Capital Partners (which was involved in the research), has experienced these characterisations in practice: "Many single-family offices pursue investment diversification strategies that blend aspects of both wealth creation and wealth preservation. However, most are clearly weighted toward one overarching philosophy that is often dictated by individual family circumstances. At this stage the alternative investment is sufficiently diverse to offer suitable investment options for investors of nearly all risk tolerances. Wealthy clients nearing retirement, for example, are more likely to pursue a wealth preservation strategy to guard against fluctuations that would negatively impact their lifestyle or restrict the generational transfer of wealth. They tend to gravitate toward alternative products that offer annuity-like returns or hedge more aggressive positions."


The survey evidence (shown in graphic 2) is that the family offices with a wealth creation investment ethos are more likely to add to their hedge fund investments than the wealth preservers. Part of the motivation for this was expressed by Bruce H. Rogers, Chief Brand Officer and Managing Director at Forbes Insights, one of the research organisers. He said "many high net-worth families are seeking to recoup wealth eroded during recent periods of market weakness. These "wealth creation" investors tend to be relatively less risk averse than those pursuing wealth preservation strategies."


Graphic 2. Most of Respondents Highly Likely to Add to Hedge Fund Investments are Wealth Creators (77.6%)

Source: Rothstein Kass, where N=134 Single-Family Offices, Wealth Preservers 22.4%

When it comes to investment strategies engaged in by hedge funds, the preferences of family office investment directors are like those of hedge fund investors generally in some ways, but not in others. Table 1 shows the expressed preferences by strategy of the family offices which were highly likely to add to their hedge fund investments. Like the respondents to the Deutsche Bank Alternative Investment Survey of March this year it is most common (53% of respondents) to state a preference of allocating new money to long/short equity funds, and it is similarly common (48%) for family offices to express a preference for distressed funds. The bias of family offices towards distressed funds was not shared by the broader range of participants to the DB survey, which had distressed funds in the lower half of the preferences ranking. Emerging markets, global macro and event driven funds are all a lot less popular as recipients of fresh investment capital amongst family offices than amongst the broader range of hedge fund investors.


Table1.

Source: Rothstein Kass


I noted at the start of this article that family offices have a series of perceived advantages as investors in hedge funds. Then I observed that family offices are probably the sort of investor most likely to be adding to their hedge fund investments in the medium term. Putting these concepts together will have some consequences for those who seek family offices as potential clients: the Rothstein Kass research notes that the competition for the investment dollars of family offices will probably grow geometrically. To succeed in this market hedge funds may have to raise their game in the marketing/sales process.


Rothstein Kass have a view on this – "investment managers will need to be highly consultative if they are to succeed in generating capital flows from single-family offices." They describe the consultative approach as having three basic components. Central to this approach is profiling the single-family offices to understand: (1) their investment orientation, (2) the roles, responsibilities and professional objectives of the Executive Directors, and (3) the professional ecosystem of each single-family office. The other basic components of the consultative approach are "creating customized explanations of offerings" and "continuously managing the relationship."


Here is the meat. The authors of the research say that "when it comes to the consultative process, we regularly find the greatest weakness among (provider) financial firms is in their profiling of family offices." They continue that "investment managers are well served by maintaining an open and ongoing dialogue with family office investors to ensure ongoing alignment of objectives and risk tolerances."


While it may be a regulatory requirement to "know your customer", there is a genuine commercial angle here. Successful selling to family offices is much more likely to occur where the selling hedge fund has made the effort to know how the family office actually works, and what the risk tolerances are (wealth creator or wealth preserver), and puts resource into developing a relationship with the key decision makers that goes beyond the immediate need to sell some product. This may be the hedge fund marketers (internal or third party) most important task in the immediate environment.

A State Pension Plan Hedge Fund Mandate - It Takes a While

American investing institutions are the dominant source of capital for the hedge fund industry. It is important to understand how and why they act. The Wyoming Retirement System just announced who would be managing its assets for its first hedge fund allocations. The winners of the mandates are not surprising, but here the focus is on the process that resulted in those winners. A search of the internet for references to the Wyoming Retirement System and hedge funds allows you to put together a chronology from the headlines:

June 2001: "Wyoming Studies Alts"

…The Wyoming pension fund is planning to make a decision about whether to push into alternatives investments such as real estate, private equity and hedge funds. ..Plan officials are working with the fund's consultant Buck Consultants.

August 2004: "Wyoming Puts Hedge Funds on the Back Burner"

…Wyoming has been slowly continuing its hedge fund education ... and would likely consider a fund of funds to temper its risk…

November 2004: "Wyoming to Decide on Hedge Funds Next Year"

…The plan has been mulling an allocation to hedge funds for more than a year…Mellon Consultants is advising…

March 2005: "Wyoming Appoints PIMCO for Absolute Return Mandate"

March 2009: "Trent May Joins Wyoming as First CIO"

…Trent May joins from hedge fund Deer Creek Capital Partners…

August 2009: "Wyoming Taps NEPC as General Consultant"

November 2009: "Wyoming Considers Its First Hedge Fund Investment"

… The change of tack has much to do with the retention of New England Pension Consulting as an advisor by the retirement system in September…

April 2010: "Wyoming Board Gives Permission to Invest in Hedge Funds"

August 2010: "Wyoming Puts out Combined Search"

…Wyoming Retirement System, is searching for multiple managers to run up to $560 million combined in a global tactical asset allocation strategy and a global macro hedge fund strategy… The system plans to hire three to six managers for a global macro hedge fund mandate, which will make up 30% of the $560 million. Trent May said the number of managers hired for both investments is dependent on RFP responses. The two investments will make up about 10% of the entire portfolio.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

As a responsible and accountable public body the Wyoming Retirement System has to make available documentation for its processes and meetings. The source document for the combined search is well put together, and can been seen here.


The selection process uses the Due Diligence Questionnaire (DDQ) as the key screening document. The risk/ return data should reduce the list of all applicants down to long list. And the DDQ can be used to get to a short list that can be evaluated for full-blown due diligence. New England Pension Consultants have put together some great questions to ask in addition to those in the standard questionnaire. They are in the full document for which the link has been given. In this case NEPC have used the Greenwich Roundtable Global Macro DDQ as the starting point – and very good that is too, as are all the Roundtable Guides. The following are extracts from the request for proposals for the hedge fund mandate:

Global Macro Hedge Fund Managers

To be considered for appointment as a global macro hedge fund manager pursuant to this proposal, investment management firms shall have not less than:

1. $250 million of verifiable total firm assets under management
2. Two (2) years verifiable Global Macro investment experience

 

List of Requested Documents & Data

DDQ

Pitchbook

Historical Monthly Returns & Monthly AuM in Excel

Organizational Chart

PPM

Biographies of Principles and Investment Professionals

Latest Monthly/Quarterly/Annual Letter & Risk Reports

EVALUATION AND SELECTION

Proposals will be evaluated and subsequent judgments made taking into account the following criteria:

• Performance – Return and volatility expectations. While each manager will be evaluated on its relative investment merits the aggregate GTAA allocation will be measured against a 60% MSCI ACWI / 40% Barclays U.S. Aggregate benchmark.

• Expertise – (a) Similar work performed for other institutions, with references of such funds to be specified in the proposal; (b) Assets under management; and (c) Investment experience broadly defined and experience in global tactical investments specifically.
  
  
• Key Personnel – Personnel to be assigned to this account, including key professionals, applicable portfolio managers, back-up and other staff assistance, and education and experience of all such key personnel.
  
  
• Fees – Reasonableness and competitiveness of fees.

• RFP Proposal – Clarity and responsiveness to requirements as requested in the RFP.

• Philosophy and Style - the extent to which the proposed philosophy and style best complement existing philosophies and styles and meet the requirements and expectations as presented in this RFP.
  
  
  Selection Process:
  
• All RFP's will be reviewed with respect to the evaluation of the proposal by the Wyoming Retirement System's staff and the Board's investment consulting firm, New England Pension Consultants (NEPC). WRS' Chief Investment Officer, with the approval of the Executive Director, and in consultation with NEPC will be the sole judge with respect to the final selection of the firm(s) hired.
  
  
• Finalists will be notified of the results of the RFP selection process as soon as possible following selection; due diligence visits may be arranged with firms who make the finalist list.
  
  

The result of the search is that Moore Capital Management, Graham Capital Management, Brevan Howard, Caxton Associates and BlueCrest Capital Management have each been given $30m of capital, and a further global macro manager is expected to be appointed. Although the RFP gives threshold criteria of at least $250m in AUM and a minimum of a 2 year track record, which give scope for dozens of firms to qualify, it is hard to argue against the selections made. Amongst the five named there is a good variety of style, bias by asset class, and differences in pattern of return. It has taken a while in this particular case, but it is easy to see, given the process, why the hedge fund industry continues to get more concentrated as it is driven by American institutional investor flows.

Chart of the Day – Funds of Hedge Funds Flat-line in Asset Flows in North America

My Chart of the Day comes from The Eurekahedge Report which looks at 2010 hedge asset flows and investment returns. The chart compares the monthly asset flows to North American hedge funds and funds of hedge funds since the start of 2008. The contrast in flows in the recovery phase is very striking: single manager hedge funds net redemptions stopped four months earlier than net redemptions to funds of funds; and there have been net subscriptions to single manager funds in most months since April 2009, and net subscriptions to funds of funds have flat-lined over the same period.

Monthly asset flows to North American hedge funds vs North American funds of hedge funds

The North American component of the hedge fund story is very constructive at the single manager level. Not only have NAVS recovered well since the Credit Crunch but in doing so last year the Eurekahedge North American Hedge Fund Index was ahead of the S&P 500 until the last month of the year. Over the last three years North American single manager hedge funds produced annualised returns of just over 7 1/2 %, versus 5 1/2 % for the Global Eurekahedge Index. Indeed American hedge funds produced better returns than funds managed from other developed regions in each of the last three years. So American single manager hedge funds have done better in performance terms than those in other regions.

The three year annualised returns of North American funds of funds are negative according to Eurekahedge, just as the MSCI North America had negative returns over the same period (to end November 2010). Further the 3-year annualised standard deviation of returns of funds of funds is the same as that for single manager hedge funds. So that on a three year basis funds of funds have not delivered absolute returns, and the volatility of returns over that period has not been lower than single manager funds (which historically had previously always been the case). So the return-for-risk argument is weak for funds of funds relative to single manager funds in North America.

As a source of capital for the whole hedge fund industry American investing institutions have become dominant. Survey evidence shows some recovery of appetite amongst institutional investors in hedge funds – questions on investment intentions produce a net positive balance from respondents on a consistent basis since the end of 2009, with US investors more positive than investors in other regions. But the "intentions" have turned into net positive flows only for single manager hedge funds in aggregate (though around 30% of funds of hedge funds report net inflows in the second half of last year). There several plausible explanations for the contrast in flows depicted in the chart.

The gap in performance between single manager hedge funds and funds of funds may have got too wide for investing institutions to bear. Historically there were a few years, over the course of decades, in which multi-manager hedge funds out-performed single manager hedge funds. So in those years there was a (relative) pay-off for strategy allocation and avoiding the under-performers and blow-ups – which is for what investors pay funds of funds. It was commercially crucial that funds of funds did that in the key year of 2008, and they didn't, as a whole. It is now many years since funds of funds in aggregate even got near single manager returns.

Given the return records for single manager and multi-manager hedge funds the additional layer of fees in the latter cannot be justified in the minds of institutional investors. Fund of funds' management fees have been falling for more than a decade, reflecting the balance of supply and demand over that time. In contrast single manager fees have held up much better, with the exception of the immediate post Credit Crunch period. Indeed Eurekahedge record that the average management fees for single manager start-ups in 2010 was higher than for 2009's start-ups.

A third plausible explanation for the difference in asset flows to the two hedge fund sectors in North America is the increased accumulated knowledge and experience of the investing institutions there. The model seems to have shifted. For most of the last decade funds of funds were the mechanism for investing institutions to allocate to hedge funds, but a knowledge transfer has taken place. The senior staff at institutions now have a familiarity with hedge fund concepts and can interpret hedge fund data readily. Whilst funds of funds companies can demonstrate advantages in due diligence process, depth of understanding of investment strategies, and risk management and portfolio construction of funds of funds compared to the dedicated resources available to most investing institutions, the latter can now comfortably find these capabilities on an out-sourced basis. External advisors for strategic decision making and tactical monitoring of hedge funds have usurped the role of the dedicated funds of funds. The same tasks are being carried out, but maybe by a combination of a very small dedicated in-house team with input from an external advisor on a fixed fee basis. A number of funds of funds companies may be retained by investing institutions to give a plurality of opinion and form of analysis, for benchmarking, but experienced investing institutions may not feel the need to pay the old fee scales. Plus the marginal increases in allocations to hedge funds by pension plans is increasingly going to direct investing in single manager funds.

In each of these regards the North American part of the industry is in the vanguard. Most of the assets of the hedge fund industry are managed by managers in the United States. For a U.S. investor to visit (and allocate to) an American hedge fund manager is a lot easier than for a Japanese investing institution – hence there will always be a place for funds of funds for Japanese investors in hedge funds. American investing institutions are the largest contributors of capital to the hedge fund industry at the moment, and will be for some time. Given all the above - relative performance, regional strengths, fee structures etcetera - plus the fact that large, branded hedge fund groups are highly likely to be American, is it any wonder that 85% of the global flows into hedge funds are going into American single manager hedge funds? 





To see more postings on multi-manager hedge funds click on "funds of hedge funds" in the LABELS gadget on the lhs of the page.
 

Testing Time Ahead for Funds of Hedge Funds

Flows into the hedge fund industry turned positive in the third quarter of last year. There have been monthly blips, but a positive trend of quarterly inflows has been in place since. This year there was a net investment of $13.7bn into hedge funds in the first quarter, followed by $9.5bn of inflows in the second quarter. In the last quarter Hedge Fund Research calculate that a net $19bn of new capital came into the industry.


The third quarter of 2010 was also a period of decent return from hedge funds, most of the gains coming in September. The positive returns for the year to date on top of the recovery of assets through net subscriptions has taken industry assets back to their previous peak of one and three-quarter trillion dollars.


It has been well recognised that flows have turned positive and that the majority of those flows have been captured by the largest single manager hedge fund groups - those overseeing $5bn or more. Some funds of hedge funds received new money in the second quarter - nearly a third of funds of funds had positive inflows then - but still in aggregate funds of funds have been losing capital for two years. Up to now. In the third quarter just finished, funds of hedge funds had a net inflow of $250m, according to HFR.

Net Subscriptions for Funds of Funds

The timing is indicative of the new reality of institutional investing in hedge funds. Just over a year on from net new subscriptions to single manager funds, multi-manager funds as a group received positive net subscriptions. The buyers of single manager hedge funds to this point were experienced institutional investors. If the first phase of taking hedge fund exposure is institutions getting exposure to the investment strategies through replication (not recommended, but it happens) or diversified funds of funds, then there are naturally other phases to follow. The second phase is likely to be the development of selection by the investing institution. This could be expressing a preference for a particular investment strategy, say distressed, or emerging market hedge funds, through selecting individual hedge funds, or allocating to a specialist fund of hedge funds.



Sometimes stage two is driven by a fee reduction exercise, or to utilise growing internal expertise, or sometimes even to put into practise an increase in allocations to alternatives or hedge funds specifically. Whatever the motivation, stage two is as likely to result in a reduction in the size of mandate managed by a fund of funds as an increase.



Institutions new to investing in hedge funds would be wise to utilise the services of a fund of hedge funds provider. So neophyte institutions and those adding to strategic allocations within their plans will have used funds of hedge funds in the growth phase of the industry to mid 2008.



In the last year we have moved from the trough of disillusionment* and are onto the slope of enlightenment for the hedge fund industry. In that time the investing institutions that are seasoned hedge fund investors have been pulling money from funds of funds to put the capital into single manager funds in aggregate.



We seem to be entering a new phase now. The recent positive net capital allocations to funds of hedge funds suggest one of two causes: that new buyers are coming into hedge funds and/or the more conservative of those existing institutional investors in hedge funds have started to add to their allocations. It is widely appreciated that the due diligence process has lengthened. So if it took 6 months from first meeting to filling in subscription documents it now takes 9 months. Starting a new hedge fund investment programme for an institution via a fund of funds might take a year or more as there is double diligence to complete, at the fund of funds level and at the single manager level.



If this hypothesis is correct funds of hedge funds should have more and larger mandates heading their way from here on. This will be tested over the rest of 2010 (particularly in December, a key month for redemptions) and will be confirmed by positive flows in the first half of 2011.



Additional: Pictet & Cie, the Swiss private bank, confirmed that it had had net inflows of $340m into its fund of hedge funds this year bringing the total AUM to $8.2bn at the end of September.

*http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/200907/manager-writes/through-the-trough-of-hedge-fund-disillusionment-.php

Confirmation that asset raising from institutions taking longer

Publicly quoted Swiss hedge fund manager Gottex Fund Management produced second quarter results this week. A comment from CEO Joachim Gottschalk took my eye: "the general (market) volatility has affected the propensity of institutional investors to make asset allocation decisions and as such asset raising efforts have become more prolonged."

So the whole process of selling, from initial contact, through multiple meetings and final due diligence, and then final sign-off on allocations of capital is taking longer and longer. The institutionally driven recovery of the hedge fund business is being stretched out, and in that process funds of hedge funds are not the marginal winners.

The Shrinkage of Hedge Fund Seeding Capital

I have written in the past (http://simonkerrhfblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/gathering-assets-still-difficult-for.html , http://simonkerrhfblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/excess-supply-of-emerging-managers-to.html ) that my expectation is that emerging manager hedge funds will find raising capital difficult. Part of the reason for this view is the shrinkage of seeding capital providers. Infovest21 is the source for this overviewing of the status quo in hedge fund seeding:



The size of assets committed in the overall seeding industry dropped in 2008/2009 as has the number of seeders actively providing seeding capital.


Seeding is very resource-intensive. It requires sourcing a wide range of proposals, having the skills and resources to analyze diverse strategies, having negotiating skills and helping put businesses together. This cuts down on the number of firms that can do it, says Patric de Gentile- Williams of FRM’s Capital Advisors. “People are getting out of seeding business because it is a very hard business - you need to find the talent, be a risk manager of the talent and have a disciplined marketing plan for the business,” adds Anthony Scaramucci of Skybridge Capital.

In 2007, there were 50-90 seeders. Today, there are just a handful of active seeders. Many of the active seeders don’t expect the seeding activity to get back to 2007 levels. Many key personnel at some of the larger seeders have left. Many are virtually out of the business but not publicly admitting to that, says one seeder.

The vast majority of seeders were a part of larger businesses. Those businesses became stressed by events in 2008 and had to refocus on their core business at the expense of their peripheral business. “Where seeding was a peripheral activity, it had to be sacrificed even though this is the one of the best times for seeding. In addition, some seeders were within investment banks and were using capital from the bank’s balance sheet. When 2008 arose, much of that capital was withdrawn,” adds Gentile-Williams.

It may be tough for some of the fund of funds’ seeders to come back. Scaramucci says, “If they don’t have the right resources in their organization, then they think they’re in the funds of funds business as a seeder. They’re not in the funds of funds business: they’re in the private equity/intellectual capital management business…When a fund of funds goes into the seeder business, they approach it the way funds of funds would. They don’t get deal terms right. They’re not partnering as tightly with the manager.”


In terms of seeing new candidates to be seeded, seeders say they haven’t seen a better environment. There are large numbers of talented people who want to be entrepreneurs who have been displaced by either the collapse of the firms they were with, whether hedge funds or investment banks, or are in an existing platform where they can’t supply enough capital.


Outlook



Gentile-Williams observes that the first quarter of 2010 has been more active than last year. “The pipeline is very strong; eight or nine managers are in [our] pipeline which could lead to a transaction in the next few months.”

Asset raising at the seed level i.e. raising a new fund is still challenging, say a number of seeders.As general interest for hedge funds picks up, emerging managers will benefit. The challenging piece is that some of the established largest managers, who had been closed, opened up to new investment following the financial crisis. Some of the largest allocators are currently going directly to the larger funds.

If the hedge fund situation improves and liquidity returns to the market, former seeders could return but they will probably do one-off deals rather than a dedicated fund. It could be done as a side letter not as a cookie cutter fund, says a former seeder.

There will be more capital committed and new players. There will be a small number of large players. Some family offices and some institutions are seeding. On the family office side, seeding is often viewed opportunistically. For example, The Koffler Group seeds only one manager or so a year. It seeded EchoBridge with $20 million in 2008. Another example is Parly Company which has seeded about 25 funds in the past.

Some larger pensions are also entering the seeding arena. CalPERS is considering providing start-up money to hedge funds similar to what it has done with private equity. The UK pension fund Railpen is expected to start a hedge fund seeding operations in order to gain greater control of alternative assets. Details haven’t been publicly disclosed yet but sources expect the model will follow the CalPERS and Hermes’ models.

In 2010, New York State Common Retirement Fund seeded London-based Finisterre’s emerging market hedge fund with $250 million.

Problems and Solutions in Investing with China-based Hedge Funds

This blog has been running for four months and this is the first posting to mention China. At the start of the year as strategists and economists gave outlooks for 2010 it was all about China. Anthony Bolton, after a career as a London-based fund manager at Fidelity dedicated to UK equities, has come out of retirement to run a Chinese equity fund and is to be based in Hong Kong. As a destination for investment, the popularity of China-focused funds is certainly on the rise. Sales of China-focused funds via Fidelity’s fund platform, FundsNetwork, increased by 59% in 2009, while sales into Fidelity’s China Focus Fund alone increased by 239%. That is how enticing China is as an investment destination. However, whilst  there has been a China theme to many investment portfolios, and the largest hedge fund companies have opened Hong Kong or mainland China offices, Chinese dedicated hedge funds have been something of a side show in the hedge fund industry. This reflects that China is much more developed as a manufacturing centre than a service and financial centre.

So China is recognised as  representing the largest global growth opportunity on a multi-year basis, but immature as far as the financial sector and capital markets are concerned. The Chinese equity markets represent a rich opportunity set, as do all frontier markets, but in this particular case, partly through cultural considerations, they can be difficult to access successfully and sustainably and with as much confidence in the execution as in the high concept. The practical difficulties were recently addressed by dedicated hedge fund site http://www.chinahedge.com.cn/, using comments by GFIA as a springboard.

The rest of this post is in two parts: the article from Chinahedge, which has been re-written but not changed in shape or substance, and in part two a full, considered response from London-based Fund of Funds manager Caliburn Capital Partners, which targeted exposure to the China theme some years ago, and which has supported exposure in the region through a Singapore office.

Part One - The Problems

The investability of mainland China based managers has become an issue, as reflected in the decision by Singapore-based research firm GFIA to stop covering and investing in hedge funds based in mainland China. It has largely shifted its coverage to western-trained managers based in Hong Kong. As an example of the issues investors face it cites that on a number of occasions China-based hedge funds would not reveal the identity of fund backers or the background of portfolio managers.

Compliance issues

The majority of offshore Chinese hedge funds are run from Hong Kong and the mainland China cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen, with very few in Beijing. For those with a Hong Kong office, almost all of them are Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission-registered.


"At the very beginning of the due diligence process for investors allocating to China hedge funds investors should check to see if the investment manager is regulated, if the fund they manage have independent directors, if the fund is administered independently by a well known firm, and if the firm is audited independently by a top grade auditor." Andy Mantel, founder and CIO of Pacific Sun Investment Management (HK) Ltd, told China Hedge by phone. Andy is one of few offshore Greater China hedge fund managers who is non-Chinese but is fluent in Mandarin having been in the Greater China Region for about 20 years. “Basically all mainland headquartered hedge fund managers fail this initial due diligence test.”


Based on the statistics of China Hedge Fund Managers (Onshore) Database complied by China Hedge, most of the mainland managers (about 200 managers) are only managing local Chinese hedge funds denominated in RMB which are not accessible by global investors. Around 10% of them are running offshore Greater China hedge funds as well. Some have HKSFC-registered operation. Only a few of them have no HKSFC-registered operations which may cause some compliance issues.

Transparency and disclosure issue

GFIA mentioned in its report that those mainland-based managers show "a lack fundamental transparency and openness." It is an issue with some mainland-based fund managers that they are not willing to disclose their real holdings, and they do not have a disciplined risk management either, according to Kaikai Hua, director of a Shanghai-based wealth management company. He said, “normally they have a bet on one or two stocks or PE investments, and cover up the big loss or a liquidity problem until the stocks stop trading, or the IPO fails.”

Before selecting China managers for their US-based institutional clients, Bill Hunnicutt strictly required the Chinese managers must be willing to accept complete portfolio transparency which is now mandatory post-Madoff. Bill is the President of Hunnicutt & Co., LLC which is a placement agency based in the US. Bill said this means showing a current portfolio upon request. “Some larger US institutions require daily transparency via a dedicated website, while others will accept transparency via 3rd party vendors who then provide a general summary of the portfolio to the client.”

Business and cultural differences

There are clear cultural differences between local managers and global investors. Most local managers come from mainland mutual funds and securities firms. They are accustomed to running funds to a local standard, not those expected by global investors. “If the local managers do not tell you the companies they hold because they do not want others copy the idea. Knowing something early than the market is an important way for them to make money", Kaikai said.


The cultural differences may be exacerbated by communication problems. Most local managers are not comfortable to talk and write in English, so, the email reporting and newsletter that foreign investors in hedge funds expect may not be produced on a timely basis, if at all. “They would rather not say anything than express something badly. It takes a while for investors to fully communicate with these managers.” Kaikai said.


So local Chinese managers have something to learn in terms of the normal global practices and standards of running a hedge fund, as recognised by international investors. It has been suggested that mainland Chinese managers of hedge funds would benefit from getting together on a regular basis to share some thoughts of running a hedge fund business – a draft practice for participants would follow. Some managers recognize that there is a trend of increasing allocation to China-based managers, and in response they have recruited Chinese partners who are Western-educated and/or have worked for Western companies so that they can acquire that necessary knowledge about the standards expected by global investors.

Changing regulated status

The current Chinese law has regulated Chinese mutual funds, but these regulations do not apply to onshore Chinese hedge funds. According to MarketWatch published by Citi Securities and Investment Services dated 17 December 2009, the mutual fund law review workgroup, set up by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, has reached an agreement to include privately-raised funds as regulated mutual funds in the revised Mutual Fund Law.


Li, Zhenning, Chairman of Shanghai Rising Fund Management and the member of the mutual fund law review workgroup suggested that the regulator release licenses on privately-raised funds (commonly called local hedge funds) in the future. Investors, thus, can expect better regulation of local hedge funds in areas such as transparency issue and information disclosure.

Comparative advantage of Chinese-speaking CIOs

”Some local CIOs are sound managers. They know what they are doing, and what risk they face. Despite the lack of transparency and absence of rigid risk control systems, mainland-based managers have a big advantage in that they know the market well. They are more alert to the growth engines in the market, as well as problems in the companies. They spend more time talking to people in the street, and ask what they think of a product. It’s much easier for them to get access to companies too,” Kaikai said.

To combine both HK and mainland managers

“Hong Kong is by far the best place to manage a China fund. Aside from the unparalleled infrastructure and regulatory environment, the free flow of instant, uncensored information is vital when making investment decisions.” Andy Mantel said. “Research activities on the mainland can only add value if it is a supplementary research and information gathering office in support of the manager's headquarters,” Mantel emphasized.”


Kaikai Hua states that Western-trained managers based in Hong Kong have a different strategy. Most of their holdings are big names and liquid stocks. They perform better in a bear market or when market is in a correction. And they have a better understanding of tools for hedging. “We see that one side are stock pickers, and the others are portfolio manager.” Hua suggests that clients combine both, so that they can enjoy the advantages each offer in accessing the growth of Chinese market.

Chinese hedge funds are growing

There is a strong case to be made that the Chinese hedge fund sector is becoming more significant within the global hedge fund industry. Many institutional investors have started to monitor and even allocate to Chinese hedge funds in their global portfolios. “We should not neglect the China market” is the common belief of most global investors.


The booming equity market has helped the growth of industry assets. The industry recorded encouraging growth figures last year. Chinese onshore hedge fund managers launched 242 products in 2009, according to a report by Chengdu, Sichuan-based Sinolink Securities Co Ltd. The average size for every fund was about 90 million yuan ($13.2m), the report said. The 151 non-structured hedge funds returned 54% on average in 2009. As the end of 2009, the local China hedge fund industry reached around RMB 50 billion ($7.4bn). Zhang Jianhui, Director of Fund Research with Sinolink Securities, said at the Sinolink Hedge Fund Forum last Saturday in Beijing that the hedge fund industry of China would manage about RMB 100 billion as at the end of 2010.

Part Two - The Solutions

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to respond to Peter Douglas’s comments. Whilst we acknowledge that Peter is well respected in the industry and has a long track record as a specialist on the Asian hedge fund industry as a whole, we would take issue with his view that mainland based managers are not transparent enough for investors to assess them properly from a qualitative perspective.



For the sake of clarity, what we mean by “mainland based managers” are those where the Portfolio Manager is generally based in China, may or may not have a Western background or speak very good English, but will have a Hong Kong office (or other location outside the mainland) and will be registered with the SFC in Hong Kong (or equivalent in other jurisdictions). This group includes some of the most well known and longest established Greater China hedge funds and all of our comments below are based on this group of managers. (There is a second group of mainland based managers who don’t have an investment management company outside of the mainland but who offer offshore products. Caliburn does not invest in this second group of managers because the law is not clear if mainland based funds offering offshore funds should be classified as Permanent Establishments, which would mean the fund and firm would be subject to tax. Currently we are seeing the market leaders in China’s mainland fund management industry, who are in the process of launching offshore products, all setting up offices outside of the mainland in Hong Kong.)


Bearing in mind the definition above, we have built an extensive peer group of mainland based managers who we monitor and from whom we receive regular updates. In our view, some of the strongest Chinese research teams from both a bottom up and top down perspective are mainland based. Their research edge comes from their ability to pay significantly more than the established, large local mutual funds so they can hire the best research analysts. We also find that in these teams there are more analysts with direct industry as well as buy or sell side research experience which provides an additional research edge.


These managers generally provide monthly reporting which is of a high standard with good portfolio level data, and they are happy to speak about the portfolio composition and their market views in some detail. If there is a problem it may be that some of the larger managers ($300m AUM or above) may be reluctant to offer transparency to other than significant investors. Equally, bottom up stock pickers may be reticent to elaborate on their rationale for individual and current stock picks. However both of these observations can be made of hedge funds in general and are not particular to China. In general we do not encounter these difficulties with the majority of funds. Clearly, full transparency is always available through a managed account with most mainland based managers. Of course, just as in the Western hedge fund industry investors will again need to meet a certain minimum investment size to take advantage of this option.


Of the three mainland based managers with whom we are currently invested, one provides us with probably the greatest transparency of any manager that we follow, including providing the full portfolio twice a month and an enormous depth of insight directly from the CEO and senior investment team. From the remaining two we receive monthly portfolio information with very good transparency such that we are able to establish and monitor all of the key risks and sources of return of the funds.


There is no question that communication is not always easy with mainland based managers. There are often cultural and language difficulties to overcome and few are polished presenters. It is therefore important to have Mandarin speaking analysts but it is not just about language. For Caliburn as a thematic investor, research does not start with the manager; we do a lot of work to understand the underlying market and investment opportunity. This includes attendance at industry and corporate conferences as well as independent meetings with regional thought leaders. The natural result of these activities is that our research team is armed with a good understanding of the Chinese macroeconomic situation, policy news and sector news together with a general knowledge of stocks in key sectors. With this as background it is possible to establish a better relationship with managers. Our thematic work supports very specific and focused questioning and with this approach we have been very pleased with the level of disclosure we have received to date.


In relation to getting comfort with the risk management processes at these firms, as with all peer groups there are funds where we trust the risk management and there are funds where we remain cautious or sceptical. Without question a significant commitment of resources and time is required to regularly communicate with the funds and ask the right risk related questions to form a view. From an operational point of view, the mainland based funds that we have approved for investment have top tier independent 3rd party service providers (administrator, custodian, prime broker, and auditor) and in this respect reflect the best practices of their non-Asian counterparts.


In terms of performance in stress periods, broadly speaking most of the China based managers are bottom up investors and they did not protect the downside in 2008 as much as we would have hoped, though poor performance over this period is a common failing from across the hedge fund industry regardless of geography. We were pleased to see a number of managers sticking to a disciplined valuation approach which meant they were already running low exposure levels before the crisis unfolded. In general terms our invested China managers fared better in the second half of 2008 than in the first half of 2008 and China managers as a group performed much better than their BRIC peers over 2008 as a whole. Importantly, a number of China managers who lost 20% or more in 2008 subsequently made significant improvements to their risk management and their adherence to risk disciplines and this has served them well in months such as January 2010, during which they cut exposure and balanced their portfolio much more effectively than during the difficult Chinese markets of early 2008.


In conclusion, overall the standard clichés apply: you get out what you put in. We commit significant time and resource to achieving a detailed understanding of each manager’s approach. We routinely make multiple trips to interview a manager in his / her office and follow up these on-site visits with a number of conference calls before deciding to bring a manager forward for discussion at our internal approval committee. There are barriers to entry and the investment opportunities may be less accessible as a consequence. However this can make the opportunities more interesting and the barriers can be overcome with a commitment of analytical time and a consistency of approach that reassures the manager that you are serious and there for the long term.

Richard Howard
Caliburn Capital Partners